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IT IS EMPHATICALLY THE PROVINCE
AND DUTY OF STATE COURTS TO SAY
WHAT TORT LAW IS
Sijin Choi*
Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in PLIVA, Inc. v.
Mensing, consumers of generic prescription drugs suffering from unwarnedof side effects largely remain without an avenue of legal recourse due to their
inability to sue their own manufacturers. But in the pursuit for legal redress,
some generic plaintiffs have pursued a narrow window of liability by
bringing failure-to-warn claims, sounding in negligence, against the
manufacturer responsible for producing the brand-name equivalent of the
generic drug. Such claims rest on the rationale that the sui generis federal
regulatory scheme governing the prescription drug industry furnishes an
inextricable nexus between the brand-name manufacturer and generic-drug
user such that it generates a negligence duty of care between them.
The case law on this duty question remains fractured. Until late 2017, the
majority of courts confronting the duty issue ruled for the brand-name
defendant and held no duty as a matter of law. However, beginning in
December of 2017, two landmark decisions by the California and
Massachusetts supreme courts, in support of duty, have called for a
reexamination of settled case law and, accordingly, given new hope to the
generic-drug user’s pursuit of legal remedy.
In light of these recent developments, this Note seeks to equip future courts
confronting the duty question with a functional understanding of the
considerations that lie on both sides of the duty inquiry. In addition, this
Note proposes a remedial position that incorporates both the policy concerns
cutting against duty and the doctrinal considerations undergirding it. At its
core, this Note argues that doctrine demands a duty be recognized and,
further, that courts have the core institutional competence to craft tort law in
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ways that will avert ruinous public policy consequences. In making this
argument, this Note conveys a fighting message to courts: where tort
doctrine says a duty of care exists, courts should endeavor to give effect to
that duty.
INTRODUCTION................................................................................ 2215
I. RETRACING THE CASE LAW’S FOOTSTEPS.................................. 2217
A. Wyeth: A False Alarm ................................................... 2218
B. PLIVA: The Collision ................................................... 2219
II. THE CASE LAW TODAY ............................................................. 2219
A. The National Landscape ................................................. 2220
B. The Minority Position: California and
Massachusetts ............................................................... 2221
C. The Majority Position: Iowa and West Virginia ........... 2223
III. KEY ARGUMENTS UNDERGIRDING BOTH SIDES OF THE
DUTY QUESTION .................................................................. 2225
A. Key Arguments Supporting the Existence of Duty .......... 2226
1. Reasonable Foreseeability Supports Duty ............... 2226
2. Recognizing Duty Is Sound Public Policy ............... 2228
a. The Incentive to Keep Warning .......................... 2229
b. “A Right Without a Remedy” ............................. 2230
B. Key Arguments Undergirding the No Duty Position ...... 2231
1. Negligence Is an End Run Around Strict
Products Liability .................................................... 2231
2. Doctrinal Arguments Weighing Against Duty......... 2233
3. Public Policy Concerns Weighing Against Duty ..... 2237
a. Recognizing Duty Will Open the Floodgates ..... 2237
b. Imposing Duty Could Chill Innovation .............. 2239
IV. RESOLUTION ............................................................................. 2240
A. Rebutting the No Duty Arguments .................................. 2241
1. The Negligence Cause of Action Has No
End Run Effect ........................................................ 2241
2. No Duty Findings Misconstrue Basic
Tort Doctrine ........................................................... 2243
B. The Case for Duty ........................................................... 2244
1. Back to the Basics: Cardozo’s MacPherson ........... 2245
2. The “Integration” Principle ...................................... 2247
3. A Fighting Message to Courts ................................. 2250
a. Core Judicial Competence in Crafting Tort
Law to Prevent Public Policy Concerns ........... 2250

2019]

THE DUTY OF STATE COURTS

2215

b. The Political Branches Provide a
Safe Harbor ...................................................... 2251
CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 2252
ADDENDUM ..................................................................................... 2253
INTRODUCTION
It is a settled expectation under modern norms that where a product’s
defect causes physical injury to its user, that user has a remedy at law.
Indeed, perhaps the telltale sign of this settled expectation is the crown jewel
of consumer protection law:
the imposition of strict liability on
manufacturers for their products’ defects.1 Yet, despite this ubiquitous
modern understanding, consumer relief remains unrealized for users2 of
generic-version prescription drugs3 who suffer from unwarned-of and
injurious side effects. Though generic users’ injuries plainly arise out of a
product defect—the generic drug’s deficient warning label—tort law
nevertheless shuts them out from pursuing any legal recourse.
This current lack of legal redress for generic users traces its roots to the
2011 U.S. Supreme Court case, PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing.4 In PLIVA, the
Court held that federal warning-label law “preempts” state tort failure-towarn claims brought against generic manufacturers.5 The Court reached this
conclusion after interpreting federal law to prohibit generic manufacturers
from unilaterally strengthening their own warning labels and, instead, only
obligating them to replicate the warnings of their brand-name counterparts.6
Thus, the Court held that preemption was triggered under the Supremacy
Clause because it was impossible for generic manufacturers to comply with
state tort warning-label obligations while also heeding federal law’s
prohibition on unilateral strengthening.7

1. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 461–62 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring) (pioneering strict products liability).
2. Users of generic drugs will hereinafter be referred to as “generic users” or “generic
plaintiffs.”
3. Prescription drugs come in two forms: brand name and generic. The brand-name
manufacturer is the first mover in the market who invests in research and development and
subsequently brings a newly developed drug to market. See Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133
S. Ct. 2466, 2470 (2013). This newly innovated drug is the “brand-name drug.” See id. In
contrast, generic manufacturers create a product—the “generic drug”—that replicates an
existing brand-name drug. See id. The generic drug is virtually a carbon copy of the brandname equivalent drug and is introduced into the market once the brand-name drug’s
exclusivity period expires. See id.
4. 564 U.S. 604 (2011).
5. Id. at 617–18. A generic prescription drug manufacturer will hereinafter be referred
to as a “generic manufacturer” or simply a “generic.”
6. Id. at 613; see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(v) (2012) (codifying the requirement that
warning labels of generic drugs be the same as their brand-name counterparts). Brand-name
prescription drug manufacturers will hereinafter be referred to as “brand-name
manufacturers.” Brand-name drug consumers will hereinafter be referred to as “brand-name
users.”
7. PLIVA, 564 U.S. at 617–18.
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Today, as a consequence of PLIVA, generic users suffering from
unwarned-of side effects are shut out from suing their own manufacturers for
failure to warn of injurious side effects.8 This shut-out effect has, however,
inspired a new form of tort litigation in which generic plaintiffs have sued
the manufacturer responsible for creating the brand-name equivalent of their
injury-causing drug.9 These suits allege negligent failure to warn, not strict
products liability, as the cause of action against the brand-name defendant10
and rest on the core contention that brand names owe generic users a duty to
warn of adverse side effects because of PLIVA’s obligation of warning-label
sameness.11 Accordingly, the crucial issue predominating the case law today
is whether generic users are owed a duty of care by brand-name
manufacturers in promulgating adequate warning labels.12
Courts appear sharply divided on this duty question. Until recently, the
vast majority of courts confronted with generic users’ failure-to-warn claims
ruled for the brand-name manufacturer and held no duty as a matter of law.13
However, beginning in December of 2017, two landmark decisions by the
California and Massachusetts supreme courts, in favor of duty,14 have
reinvigorated the generic plaintiff’s cause and, more notably, marked a key
development in prescription drug jurisprudence. Now, with the arrival of
these two decisions, it is likely that courts across the country will be asked to
reconsider generic users’ failure-to-warn claims brought against brand-name
manufacturers.
The sharp divide in the case law regarding duty is entirely plausible.15
Inherent in this difficult duty question are complex and interrelated
considerations that provide a smattering of doctrine, public policy, history,
fairness, and, more profoundly, the metaphysical role of duty in tort law.16
Crucially, how courts view generic users’ negligence claims is often
dispositive of how they will come out on the duty question: if causation or
8. See id. at 643 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
9. See, e.g., Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165 (4th Cir. 1994); Kellogg v.
Wyeth, 762 F. Supp. 2d 694 (D. Vt. 2010); T.H. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 407 P.3d 18 (Cal.
2017); Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 299 (Ct. App. 2008); Rafferty v. Merck & Co.,
92 N.E.3d 1205 (Mass. 2018).
10. Flynn v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 627 N.W.2d 342 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001); Franzman
v. Wyeth, Inc., 451 S.W.3d 676 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014); Silva v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., No.
31,276, 2013 WL 4516160 (N.M. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2013); Weese v. Pfizer, Inc., No.
153742/12, 2013 WL 5691993 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 8, 2013); McNair v. Johnson & Johnson,
818 S.E.2d 852 (W. Va. 2018).
11. See infra Part III.A.
12. See John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the
Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657, 658–59 (2001) (surveying the laws
of fifty jurisdictions and concluding that every state, except two, retains duty as a prima facie
element of negligence). In negligence suits, the duty element is a question of law for the court
to decide in the first instance. See 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 78 (2018) (surveying tort
law across the country). Failure to prove the duty element will thus prevent the negligence
case from proceeding to trial. See id.
13. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
14. Novartis, 407 P.3d at 18; Rafferty, 92 N.E.3d at 1205.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part III.
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public policy is used as a proxy for duty, then indeed, there is no cause of
action because the generic user did not ingest the brand name’s product and
imposing duty presents serious policy risks;17 but if duty is analyzed using
traditional doctrinal considerations—such as reasonable foreseeability—the
case for duty grows much stronger.18
Against this backdrop, this Note argues that there is a way for courts to
recognize a duty of care while maintaining fidelity to both the public policy
and doctrinal justifications that lie at the crux of the duty question.19 This
remedial approach, which is discussed extensively in Part IV, rests on two
fundamental planks: first, history and the distinctive features of the brandname, generic-user relationship generate a duty of care, and second, courts
have the core institutional competence to craft tort law in ways that will avert
the relevant public policy concerns. Put simply, this Note sets forth a judicial
solution that will allow courts to achieve a win-win situation by recognizing
duty.
This Note is organized into four Parts. Part I examines the development
of failure-to-warn jurisprudence in the prescription drug context by
examining two landmark Supreme Court decisions, Wyeth v. Levine20 and
PLIVA. Part II analyzes the key implications of PLIVA on prescription drug
jurisprudence and subsequently looks at the current state of affairs through
an in-depth discussion of four emblematic cases on the duty question. Part
III then isolates the key arguments found in the case law underlying each side
of the duty inquiry. Finally, Part IV argues for the recognition of a duty of
care using a remedial duty framework that encapsulates both the doctrinal
and public policy rationales at stake. A brief Addendum at the end of this
Note addresses the Court's recent opinion in Air & Liquid Systems Corp. v.
DeVries.21 This decision, despite being a maritime law case, is included
because it provides reasoning that further substantiates the position this Note
advances.
At bottom, this Note seeks to equip future courts confronting the duty
question with a functional understanding of the considerations coloring the
duty discussion while also delivering its own core message: where tort
doctrine tells us there is a duty, yet public policy considerations stand in the
way, courts should endeavor to give effect to that duty.
I. RETRACING THE CASE LAW’S FOOTSTEPS
Since the advent of products liability law for prescription drugs, it was
widely assumed that a prescription drug manufacturer’s duty to warn of
harmful side effects progressed along two parallel tracks: state tort law and

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part IV.
555 U.S. 555 (2009).
No. 17-1104 (U.S. Mar. 19, 2019).
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the federal regulatory scheme.22 Ostensibly, these two bodies of law were
understood to coexist and operate in distinct spheres of influence.23
Beginning in 2009, however, this long-held understanding came under attack
as efforts intensified in forcing a collision between state and federal law.24
In 2011, those efforts bore fruit and culminated in a direct collision.25
A. Wyeth: A False Alarm
In Wyeth v. Levine, plaintiff Diane Levine developed gangrene after
ingesting the brand-name drug Phenergan.26 Shortly thereafter, Levine sued
Phenergan’s manufacturer, Wyeth, claiming that under Vermont tort law,
Wyeth was liable for her injuries because it had failed to include the risk of
gangrene on Phenergan’s warning label.27 At first blush, Levine’s suit
seemed to be a standard failure-to-warn products liability claim brought by
an injured consumer against her product’s manufacturer.28 Wyeth, however,
defended with a novel argument: because Phenergan’s warning label had
been approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) pursuant to
federal regulations, federal law preempted Levine’s state tort claims alleging
failure to warn.29 In essence, Wyeth’s position claimed that federal warninglabel law had collided with state tort law, and thus, the latter had to give
way.30 Suddenly, what had historically been viewed as two conceptually
distinct bodies of law were now being pitted directly against one another in
the shadow of the Supremacy Clause.31
Wyeth’s suspected collision, however, turned out to be a false alarm.32 The
Court, in a 6-3 decision, distinguished state tort law from the FDA’s
prescription drug warning-label obligations and declined to find
preemption.33 To reach this decision, the Court reasoned that federal law sets
the floor on the level of warning-label obligations drug manufacturers owe
to their consumers, not the ceiling.34 Accordingly, state tort law could
impose supplementary warning-label obligations that were otherwise lacking
under federal law.35 Wyeth thus reaffirmed the customary understanding that
state tort law and federal law compelled separate warning-label obligations
that run on parallel tracks.

22. See PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 634 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(examining the history of state and federal regulation of the prescription drug industry).
23. See id.
24. See generally Wyeth, 555 U.S. 555.
25. See PLIVA, 564 U.S. at 634 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
26. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 558–60.
27. Id.
28. See id.
29. Id. at 580–81.
30. See id. at 581.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 572.
33. Id. at 573.
34. Id. at 575.
35. Id. at 572.
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B. PLIVA: The Collision
Just one year after deciding Wyeth, the Court granted certiorari on another
potential collision case: PLIVA. Like Diane Levine in Wyeth, the plaintiffs
in PLIVA also suffered a serious side effect—tardive dyskinesia—after
ingesting the prescription drug metoclopramide.36 Seeking damages for their
injuries, the plaintiffs brought state tort claims against metoclopramide’s
manufacturer for its failure to warn of the paralyzing disease.37 In response
to the plaintiffs’ claims, the defendant-manufacturer argued federal
preemption, which proceeded on a similar theory to that of the preemption
defense in Wyeth.38 As before, the defense was steering the failure-to-warn
litigation toward a collision between federal and state law.
This time, however, the Court saw things differently and distinguished
Wyeth on the preemption question.39 To the Court, PLIVA did, in fact, trigger
preemption because the defendant happened to be a generic manufacturer and
not a brand-name manufacturer, which had been the case in Wyeth.40 The
Court held that this pivotal distinction—brand name versus generic—created
fundamentally discrepant warning-label obligations under federal law that
dictated the disposition of the preemption issue: while brand-name
manufacturers were under a duty to continuously monitor and warn of newly
discovered side effects, generic manufacturers were simply obligated to
maintain a warning label that replicated the brand name’s label.41
Furthermore, the Court granted deference to the FDA’s views, as espoused
in an amicus brief, and found that generic manufacturers were prohibited
under federal law from unilaterally strengthening their own warning labels.42
Thus, because generic manufacturers could not unilaterally strengthen their
own warnings labels, the Court held preemption was triggered because the
plaintiffs’ failure-to-warn claims sought to impose warning-label obligations
on the generic defendant that federal law expressly prohibited it from
discharging.43
II. THE CASE LAW TODAY
As stated before, the Court’s decision in PLIVA has set the stage for
modern prescription drug jurisprudence. Most notably, in an effort to
circumvent preemption, generic users have pursued a narrow window of
liability by bringing negligence suits alleging failure to warn against brand-

36. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 609 (2011).
37. Id. at 610.
38. Id.
39. See id. at 624.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. It is important to remember that failure-to-warn claims brought against brandname manufacturers are not preempted because brand names can unilaterally strengthen their
prescription drug warning labels. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 572–73 (2009).
43. See PLIVA, 564 U.S. at 617–18.
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name manufacturers.44 As a threshold matter, generic plaintiffs must first
establish the duty element under negligence law if their claims are to survive
summary judgment. Accordingly, how courts come out on the duty element
is crucial to determining the viability of generic users’ claims and, more
fundamentally, their ability to collect damages.45
This Part picks up where PLIVA left off by analyzing PLIVA’s key legal
effects on failure-to-warn jurisprudence. This Part then builds toward the
threshold duty issue underlying generic users’ failure-to-warn claims and
surveys the national landscape of past decisions that have addressed this duty
question. Finally, this Part details four emblematic cases on the duty question
decided by the highest courts of California, Iowa, Massachusetts, and West
Virginia.46
A. The National Landscape
PLIVA has produced an anomalous pocket of tort law where generic users
who suffer from unwarned-of and injurious side effects are left without an
avenue of legal recourse against the manufacturers of their generic drugs.47
Yet, litigation over the prescription drug industry’s warning-label obligations
continues albeit in a different context48: generic plaintiffs have homed in on
a new target by bringing failure-to-warn claims, sounding in negligence,
against the brand-name manufacturer responsible for creating their drug’s
brand-name equivalent.49 Pursuant to Wyeth, such claims are not preempted
because, unlike generic manufacturers, brand-name manufacturers can
unilaterally strengthen their own warning labels.50 Putting aside preemption,
then, the crucial legal issue that is now the locus of failure-to-warn litigation
is whether brand-name manufacturers owe a duty to generic users to
adequately warn of a drug’s adverse side effects. Indeed, this duty question
remains hotly contested due, in substantial part, to the salient fact that generic
users have neither bought nor directly ingested the brand-name product.51
Thus, the duty question can be condensed and rephrased: Can a brand-name
44. See, e.g., T.H. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 407 P.3d 18 (Cal. 2017); Rafferty v. Merck
& Co., 92 N.E.3d 1205 (Mass. 2018).
45. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
46. There are many well-reasoned cases addressing the duty question. This Note,
however, has selected the California, Iowa, Massachusetts, and West Virginia decisions for
further discussion because of their recency and their status as binding authoritative precedent
in their respective states.
47. See PLIVA, 564 U.S. at 643 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
48. See Victor E. Schwartz et al., Warning: Shifting Liability to Manufacturers of BrandName Medicines When the Harm Was Allegedly Caused by Generic Drugs Has Severe Side
Effects, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1835, 1837 (2013).
49. See, e.g., Novartis, 407 P.3d at 18; Rafferty, 92 N.E.3d at 1205.
50. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 572–73 (2009).
51. See, e.g., Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 169–70 (4th Cir. 1994)
(holding that there was no duty of care owed due to a lack of privity); Couick v. Wyeth, Inc.,
691 F. Supp. 2d 643, 645 (W.D.N.C. 2010) (concluding that no duty of care existed because
the generic plaintiff did not ingest the brand-name drug); Stoddard v. Wyeth, Inc., 630 F.
Supp. 2d 631, 634 (E.D.N.C. 2009) (holding that no duty of care existed due to lack of
causation).
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manufacturer be held to owe a duty of care to consumers of its competitor’s
product?52
Courts are deeply divided on this duty question. Until December 2017,
the case law on the duty question remained lopsided: a majority of courts
addressing the issue had sided with the brand-name manufacturer and held
that no duty existed as a matter of law.53 Reflecting this majority position,
two state supreme courts—Iowa54 and West Virginia55—made the no duty
position the law of the land in their respective states.56 Conversely, courts
recognizing a duty of care seemed firmly entrenched in the minority camp.57
However, two recent state supreme court decisions—from California and
Massachusetts—may indicate a resurgence of the minority position.
B. The Minority Position: California and Massachusetts
In late 2017, the Supreme Court of California in T.H. v. Novartis
Pharmaceuticals Corp.58 held that the brand-name manufacturer, Novartis,
52. Some have referred to this form of liability as “competitor liability” or “innovator
liability.” See generally Schwartz et al., supra note 48 (using the phrase “competitor
liability”); Wesley E. Weeks, Picking Up the Tab for Your Competitors: Innovator Liability
After PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1257 (2012) (using the phrase
“innovator liability”).
53. See, e.g., In re Darvocet, Darvon, & Propoxyphene Prods. Liab. Litig., 756 F.3d 917,
939 (6th Cir. 2014); Moretti v. Wyeth, Inc., 579 F. App’x 563, 565 (9th Cir. 2014); Lashley
v. Pfizer, Inc., 750 F.3d 470, 478 (5th Cir. 2014); Strayhorn v. Wyeth Pharm., Inc., 737 F.3d
378, 406 (6th Cir. 2013); Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 727 F.3d 1273, 1290 (10th Cir. 2013);
Guarino v. Wyeth, LLC, 719 F.3d 1245, 1253 (11th Cir. 2013); Bell v. Pfizer, Inc., 716 F.3d
1087, 1093–94 (8th Cir. 2013); Demahy v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc., 702 F.3d 177, 184 (5th Cir.
2012); Smith v. Wyeth, Inc., 657 F.3d 420, 424 (6th Cir. 2011); Foster, 29 F.3d at 167;
Coleson v. Janssen Pharm., Inc., 251 F. Supp. 3d 716, 721–22 (S.D.N.Y. 2017); Chatman v.
Pfizer, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 2d 641, 658 (S.D. Miss. 2013); Couick, 691 F. Supp. 2d at 645;
Stoddard, 630 F. Supp. 2d at 631; Sharp v. Leichus, No. 2004-CA-0643, 2006 WL 515532, at
*7 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 17, 2006); PLIVA, Inc. v. Dement, 780 S.E.2d 735, 743 (Ga. Ct. App.
2015); Huck v. Wyeth, Inc., 850 N.W.2d 353, 380 (Iowa 2014); Stanley v. Wyeth, Inc., 991
So. 2d 31, 35 (La. Ct. App. 2008); Flynn v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 627 N.W.2d 342, 350
(Minn. Ct. App. 2001); Franzman v. Wyeth, Inc., 451 S.W.3d 676, 691 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014);
Silva v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., No. 31,276, 2013 WL 4516160, at *4 (N.M. Ct. App.
Feb. 7, 2013); Weese v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 153742/12, 2013 WL 5691993, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Oct. 8, 2013); McNair v. Johnson & Johnson, 818 S.E.2d 852, 867 (W. Va. 2018).
54. See Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 380.
55. See McNair, 818 S.E.2d at 867.
56. Issues of tort law are generally a matter of state substantive law. Thus, federal court
decisions on the duty question are predictions of what the state’s highest court would hold as
a matter of law. Accordingly, while federal decisions are relevant to the duty question, they
are not dispositive on substantive state law questions. See Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, 159 So. 3d
649, 663 (Ala. 2014) (recognizing a duty of care in response to a question certified from the
Middle District of Alabama). As the Eleventh Circuit observed, “considerations of comity
and federalism counsel that we proceed gingerly when venturing into uncharted waters of state
substantive law.” See Guarino, 719 F.3d at 1251.
57. See, e.g., Garner v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 1:16-cv-01494-SLD-JEH, 2017 WL
6945335, at *7–8 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 6, 2017); Kellogg v. Wyeth, 762 F. Supp. 2d 694, 709 (D.
Vt. 2010); Weeks, 159 So. 3d at 649; T.H. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 407 P.3d 18, 47–48 (Cal.
2017); Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 299, 318 (Ct. App. 2008); Rafferty v. Merck &
Co., 92 N.E.3d 1205, 1219–20 (Mass. 2018).
58. 407 P.3d 18 (Cal. 2017).
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owed injured generic users a duty to warn of adverse side effects.59 In
Novartis, the plaintiffs were newborns who had developed brain defects
while in utero because their mothers had ingested the generic drug
terbutaline.60 The newborns subsequently brought suit against Novartis for
negligently failing to warn of terbutaline’s developmental side effects.61 In
its defense, Novartis contended that it owed no duty to warn of the
developmental side effects at issue for the plain fact that their mothers had
not ingested Novartis’s drug.62
The Supreme Court of California, however, emphatically disagreed with
Novartis, and after applying a multifactor duty test, held that a duty of care
flowed between Novartis and the injured generic plaintiffs.63 Embedded in
the court’s rationale was a “constellation of [duty] factors,” led by
foreseeability and public policy.64 On the foreseeability consideration, the
court reasoned that it was “entirely foreseeable” to Novartis that any defects
in its warning label would generate risks of harm to generic users because of
federal law’s requirement that generic manufacturers maintain the same
warning labels as their brand-name counterparts.65 Thus, because Novartis
could foresee harm to generic users, the court stated that the company owed
a duty to adequately warn generic users of adverse side effects.66
In addition to foreseeability, the Novartis court also found public policy to
cut in favor of imposing a duty of care.67 For one, the court observed that
recognizing duty would expose Novartis to increased failure-to-warn liability
and, accordingly, would further incentivize Novartis to diligently update its
warning labels once new side effects came to light.68 Indeed, the court found
this public policy justification particularly compelling since brand-name
manufacturers, under PLIVA, are the only market participants capable of
unilaterally strengthening prescription drug warning labels.69 Thus, after
balancing both principle and policy, the court concluded that a duty of care
existed and paved the way for the newborn plaintiffs’ failure-to-warn claims
to proceed to trial.70
Just three months after the Novartis decision, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court in Rafferty v. Merck & Co.71 also held that a duty of care
59. Id. at 47.
60. Id. at 22.
61. Id.
62. Id. A wrinkle in the facts was that, by the time of litigation, Novartis had divested
ownership of the brand-name drug. See id. at 40. Novartis claimed that this divestment
extinguished liability, but the court ultimately rejected this argument. See id. at 47.
63. Id. at 28.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 29.
66. Id. The court also found additional considerations—the degree of certainty that the
plaintiff suffered injury, closeness of the relationship, moral blame, and availability of
insurance—to weigh in favor of recognizing a duty of care. Id. at 28–30.
67. Id. at 31–32.
68. See id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 47.
71. 92 N.E.3d 1205 (Mass. 2018).
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existed between brand-name manufacturers and generic users.72 Like its
predecessor court in Novartis,73 the Rafferty court agreed that foreseeability
cut in favor of recognizing a duty of care;74 however, on the public policy
issue, the court found itself at a crossroads.75 On the one hand, the court
reasoned that recognizing a duty of care would provide much-needed relief
to injured generic users and enhance the financial incentive for brand names
to vigilantly warn of adverse side effects.76 But on the other hand, the court
observed that imposing a duty could expose brand-name manufacturers to
excessive liability and potentially chill prescription drug innovation.77 After
weighing the competing policy considerations at stake, the court split the
baby and held that brand-name manufacturers owe generic users a duty “not
to act in reckless disregard of an unreasonable risk of death or grave bodily
injury.”78 Thus, by recalibrating the standard of care under the breach
element from negligence to recklessness, the court endeavored to limit brandname manufacturer liability while still holding the manufacturer accountable
for its more egregious conduct.79 Under Rafferty, then, generic users could
bring reckless—but not negligent—failure-to-warn claims against brandname manufacturers.80
In sum, this pair of well-reasoned state supreme court decisions, Novartis
and Rafferty, represents a pivotal development in prescription drug failureto-warn jurisprudence. To be sure, although courts recognizing a duty of care
are still the exception—not the norm81—this minority view now has bite due
to the endorsement of the high courts of California and Massachusetts. At
the same time, however, it is necessary to temper this optimism with
pragmatism, given the status quo majority “no duty” view.82 Thus, this Part
now turns to two emblematic cases of this majority view.
C. The Majority Position: Iowa and West Virginia
In July 2014, the Supreme Court of Iowa decided Huck v. Wyeth, Inc.,83 a
now-leading authority in the no duty case law. In Huck, the plaintiff
consumed the generic drug—metoclopramide—and consequently developed
severe tardive dyskinesia, a disease which the manufacturer had failed to

72. Id. at 1219.
73. Interestingly, despite the two cases’ close proximity to one another, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court did not reference the California decision in its opinion.
74. Rafferty, 92 N.E.3d at 1213–14.
75. See id. at 1215–20.
76. Id. at 1217–18.
77. Id. at 1215–17. But see T.H. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 407 P.3d 18, 32 (Cal. 2017)
(observing that imposing a duty of care would not place an onerous burden on brand-name
manufacturers because they are already obligated under federal law to warn of ongoing risks).
78. Rafferty, 92 N.E.3d at 1219.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1219–20.
81. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
83. 850 N.W.2d 353 (Iowa 2014).
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adequately warn her about.84 Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff sued the
manufacturers of metoclopramide and metoclopramide’s brand-name
equivalent on a failure-to-warn theory.85 But from the outset, the plaintiff’s
claims against the generic manufacturer were preempted under PLIVA.86
Thus, the only tenable claims left standing before the Supreme Court of Iowa
were the plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claims alleged against the manufacturer
of metoclopramide’s brand-name equivalent.87 The viability of these claims,
in turn, rested on the threshold question of whether the brand-name defendant
owed a duty to warn of tardive dyskinesia to the generic plaintiff.88
In addressing this gateway duty question, the court concluded that the
brand-name defendant owed no duty to warn of injurious side effects to
generic users, such as the plaintiff.89 Though the court’s opinion contained
a treasure trove of arguments supporting no duty,90 the driving engine of its
decision rested on two primary rationales. First, the plaintiff’s case was
essentially a product liability action—cloaked in negligence—which lacked
the necessary causation predicate,91 and, second, compelling public policy
considerations counseled against finding a duty of care.92
To begin, the court held that causation was a necessary predicate for
imposing a duty of care under Iowa tort law. This proved fatal to the
plaintiff’s claim since her injury was caused by the generic drug—
metoclopramide—and not the brand-name drug.93 Accordingly, duty could
not exist because the causation requirement necessary under Iowa law could
not be met.94 In addition, the court took into consideration the public policy
implications of imposing a duty of care and found duty undesirable because
it would levy a substantial burden on brand-name manufacturers to
compensate a vast population of the prescription drug industry; thus, this
policy concern provided an additional justification to reject duty.95 Indeed,
by emphasizing the public policy considerations in conducting its duty
analysis, the Huck court manifested its conception of the duty element under
negligence as merely a euphemism for a cost-benefit analysis of liability,
which in this case, warranted a no duty decision.96

84. Id. at 358–60.
85. Id. at 360–62.
86. Id. at 361; see also PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 614–15 (2011).
87. Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 361.
88. See id.
89. Id. at 380.
90. See id. at 369–82.
91. See id. at 371–75; see also infra Part III.B.1.
92. See Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 376–81.
93. See id. at 376.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 377.
96. See id. at 376 (“In short, a lack of duty may be found if either the relationship between
the parties or [public] policy considerations warrants such a conclusion.” (quoting McCormick
v. Nikkel & Assocs., 819 N.W.2d 368, 371 (Iowa 2012))).
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Four years later, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia followed
suit in McNair v. Johnson & Johnson97 and declined to recognize duty.98 In
McNair, the plaintiff began suffering from acute respiratory distress
syndrome (ARDS) after consuming the generic drug levofloxacin.99
Levofloxacin’s warning label, however, did not include the risk of ARDS
because its brand-name counterpart, Levaquin, also lacked warning of ARDS
in its label.100 Hence, the injured plaintiff filed suit against Levaquin’s
manufacturer on the theory that it had negligently failed to warn about the
risk of ARDS.101 Here, like Huck, the duty question took center stage as the
focus of appellate review before West Virginia’s highest court.
After examining a series of duty considerations, the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia concluded that Levaquin’s manufacturer owed no
duty to warn of ARDS to the plaintiff.102 Similar to the reasoning in Huck,
the court found the lack of causation by the brand-name product103 and
underlying public policy concerns to foreclose the possibility of duty.104
Additionally, while the court acknowledged that foreseeability cut against its
position,105 it nevertheless hunkered down and buttressed its reasoning with
a litany of federal and state no duty precedents.106 In sum, West Virginia’s
highest court, too, viewed the duty element of negligence as predominantly
a question of public policy and, after weighing the competing policy interests
at stake, declined to recognize duty in order to cater to compelling policy
interests.107
III. KEY ARGUMENTS UNDERGIRDING BOTH SIDES OF THE
DUTY QUESTION
Generic users have predominantly litigated failure-to-warn claims against
brand-name defendants under the traditional tort of negligence or the tort of
negligent misrepresentation.108 Regardless, the inquiry that is universally
significant, and the central focus of this Note, is the threshold question of
whether the brand-name manufacturer owes a duty of care to generic users
in providing adequate warning labels.109 This inquiry is crucial because a
finding of no duty by courts in the first instance sounds the death knell for
97. 818 S.E.2d 852 (W. Va. 2018).
98. Id. at 861.
99. Id. at 858–59.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 861.
103. Id. at 863.
104. Id. at 865–67.
105. See id. at 862.
106. See id. at 863.
107. See id. at 865.
108. See, e.g., T.H. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 407 P.3d 18, 26 (Cal. 2017) (addressing both
negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims).
109. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 12, at 658–59 (observing that forty-eight states
retain duty as an element of negligence).
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generic users’ negligence claims.110 Thus, this Note now turns to the key
arguments courts have considered in reaching their conclusions about the
existence of a duty of care. This Part begins by discussing the principal
arguments supporting duty and then transitions to the key rationales
undergirding the no duty position.
A. Key Arguments Supporting the Existence of Duty
Courts, in finding a duty of care, have advanced a string of recurring
arguments in support of their positions. Chief among them are prominent
doctrinal factors, such as reasonable foreseeability, and public policy
considerations. This section discusses these in turn.
1. Reasonable Foreseeability Supports Duty
Since the dawn of negligence in common law,111 the foreseeability of
physical harm has endured as a significant consideration with respect to the
duty element.112 This is not a coincidence given that the principle underlying
foreseeability is a powerfully intuitive one: when conducting an activity that
raises a foreseeable risk of harm to a class of persons, take due care to prevent
such harms from being realized. This timeless principle, as applied to the
brand-name, generic-user context, produces a compelling justification for
courts recognizing a duty of care from the former to the latter.113
Well established under federal law is the obligation of generic
manufacturers to maintain the same warning labels as those of the brand
name.114 Accordingly, due to this sui generis federal scheme, the brandname manufacturer “knows to a legal certainty” that any deficiencies in its
own warning label will also contaminate the generic drug’s label.115
Precisely because the brand name knows this crucial fact—that a defective
brand-name label will cause an identically defective generic label—courts
have found that the risk of harm to generic users is foreseeable and that this
foreseeability, in turn, generates a duty of care between brand names and

110. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
111. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916) (considering
foreseeability under duty); Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 409–10 (1852) (same); see also
Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 299, 311–12 (Ct. App. 2008) (stating that foreseeability
has been a primary consideration under duty for over eighty years).
112. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Foreseeability in Breach, Duty, and Proximate Cause, 44
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1247, 1258–62 (2009) (finding that every state, except three, treats
foreseeability as a “significant factor” in analyzing duty of care in negligence cases).
113. See, e.g., Kellogg v. Wyeth, 762 F. Supp. 2d 694, 706 (D. Vt. 2010) (finding that the
risk of harm to generic users was “entirely foreseeable”); Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, 159 So. 3d
649, 670 (Ala. 2014) (holding that foreseeability favors finding a duty of care); Novartis, 407
P.3d at 29–30; Conte, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 311–12 (finding a duty of care based on
foreseeability); Rafferty v. Merck & Co., 92 N.E.3d 1205, 1215 (Mass. 2018).
114. See PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 624 (2011).
115. Novartis, 407 P.3d at 29; see also Kellogg, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 706; Rafferty, 92 N.E.3d
at 1215.
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generic users.116 Furthermore, some courts have gone even further and
observed that injury to generic users is not simply foreseeable but eminently
foreseeable and that federal law’s obligation of warning-label equivalence
elevates the degree of foreseeability to near certitude.117 Therefore, the
conclusion follows that the amplified degree of harm foreseen by the brandname manufacturer obligates it to take reasonable care to avoid causing such
harm to generic users.118
As the case law demonstrates, foreseeability has turned out to be a
powerful justification: nearly every court ruling in favor of duty has relied
substantially on foreseeability to supply its rationale.119 Among them, three
state supreme courts—Alabama,120 California,121 and Massachusetts122—
have found foreseeability to be highly probative of duty. Conversely, courts
coming out the other way and holding no duty have also acknowledged that
foreseeability cuts against their position.123 Nevertheless, these courts justify
their no duty holdings with other considerations, such as public policy.124
Though federal law does most of the heavy lifting in furnishing
foreseeability, state regulatory regimes also play a prominent role. Currently,
all fifty states have “state substitution laws” which permit—and sometimes
even require—pharmacists to substitute brand-name prescriptions with
generic drugs where it is more affordable for the patient.125 Under such a
regulatory regime, a generic user may have been originally prescribed a

116. See Kellogg, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 706; Novartis, 407 P.3d at 29–30; Rafferty, 92 N.E.3d
at 1215.
117. Conte, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 311–13; see Kellogg, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 706; Novartis, 407
P.3d at 29; Rafferty, 92 N.E.3d at 1215.
118. See Kellogg, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 706; Novartis, 407 P.3d at 29; Conte, 85 Cal. Rptr. at
311–12; Rafferty, 92 N.E.3d at 1215.
119. See, e.g., Garner v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 1:16-cv-01494-SLD-JEH, 2017 WL
6945335, at *7 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 6, 2017) (recognizing a duty of care because injuries to generic
users were reasonably foreseeable); Kellogg, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 705; Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks,
159 So. 3d 649, 670 (Ala. 2014) (ruling for duty based on the foreseeability of harm); Novartis,
407 P.3d at 29–30; Conte, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 311–12; Rafferty, 92 N.E.3d at 1214.
120. See Weeks, 159 So. 3d at 670.
121. See Novartis, 407 P.3d at 29–30.
122. See Rafferty, 92 N.E.3d at 1214.
123. See, e.g., Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 727 F.3d 1273, 1284–86 (10th Cir. 2013) (discussing
foreseeability but finding no duty on other grounds); McNair v. Johnson & Johnson, 818
S.E.2d 852, 862 (W. Va. 2018) (noting that foreseeability is “important” but finding no duty
on policy grounds). But see Huck v. Wyeth, Inc., 850 N.W.2d 353, 375–76 (Iowa 2014)
(holding that there existed no duty of care but observing that foreseeability does not enter the
analysis).
124. See infra Part III.B.
125. See PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 628 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(“Currently, all States have some form of generic substitution law.”); Rafferty, 92 N.E.3d at
1216; see also Schwartz et al., supra note 48, at 1846–48 (observing that all fifty states have
adopted some version of state substitution laws allowing pharmacists to fill a brand-name
prescription with a more affordable generic equivalent). Note that generic drugs are generally
cheaper than their brand-name counterparts, which makes statutory substitution highly likely
in many states. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., UNDERSTANDING RECENT TRENDS IN
GENERIC DRUG PRICES 1 (2016), https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/175071/
GenericsDrugpaperr.pdf [https://perma.cc/434C-B5GE].
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brand-name drug but, due to statutory substitution, is forced to consume the
generic version126 and thus preempted from suing under PLIVA.127
As applied to duty, courts have found that statutory substitution laws
enhance the foreseeability argument because they alert the brand-name
manufacturer to the reality that many generic users will rely directly on its
warning label despite ultimately consuming a generic counterpart.128
Accordingly, whether the consumer bought and ingested the brand-name
drug is no longer an accurate litmus test for who, in fact, initially relied on
the brand-name drug’s warning label.129 As a result, state substitution laws
have been construed to add an extra layer of depth to the foreseeability
argument.130
Additionally, state substitution laws—as applied to the brand-name,
generic-user context—arguably pose a fundamental fairness concern. In her
scathing dissent in PLIVA, Justice Sotomayor claimed that preempting
generic users from suing is inequitable because state substitution laws permit
pharmacists to unilaterally swap brand-name prescriptions with generic
ones.131 Therefore, in a jurisdiction with a statutory substitution regime,
preempting generic users from bringing suit would unfairly penalize them for
the state-mandated dispensing decisions of their pharmacists.132 Were it not
for state substitution laws, Justice Sotomayor contended, generic users who
had initially been prescribed brand-name drugs would have retained their
right to sue if they suffered injurious side effects.133 Thus, to conclude, state
substitution laws present a basic fairness concern that sheds doubt on the
brand-name, generic-user dichotomy.
2. Recognizing Duty Is Sound Public Policy
Although opponents of duty have relied heavily on public policy
considerations to justify their positions,134 courts taking the minority view
have managed to advance several public policy rationales of their own.

126. See Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, 159 So. 3d 649, 670 (Ala. 2014); Novartis, 407 P.3d at 30;
Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 299, 313 (Ct. App. 2008).
127. See PLIVA, 564 U.S. at 609.
128. See Weeks, 159 So. 3d at 670; Novartis, 407 P.3d at 30; Conte, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
129. See Weeks, 159 So. 3d at 670.
130. See id.; Novartis, 407 P.3d at 30; Conte, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
131. See PLIVA, 564 U.S. at 643 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[W]hether a consumer
harmed by inadequate warnings can obtain relief turns solely on the happenstance of whether
her pharmacist filled her prescription with a brand-name or generic drug.”). Also note that
this problem is further perpetuated by the reality that most prescription drug consumers do not
know ex ante that consuming the brand-name drug preserves their right to legal redress, while
consuming the generic drug shuts them out under PLIVA. Thus, maintaining the distinction
between generic-drug and brand-name-drug users effects an inequitable result not attributable
to a conscious purchase decision by the consumer.
132. Id.
133. See id.; see also Weeks, 159 So. 3d at 670; Novartis, 407 P.3d at 30.
134. See infra Part III.B.
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a. The Incentive to Keep Warning
One public policy served by imposing a duty of care is the incentive it
would provide for brand-name manufacturers to continuously update their
warning labels beyond their exclusivity periods.135 It is a widely known fact
that brand-name manufacturers experience a “precipitous decline” in sales
once their exclusivity periods end and generic drugs enter the market.136
Unsurprisingly, due to competition from their cheaper generic-drug
counterparts, brand-name pharmaceuticals occupy less than 10 percent of the
market after the exclusivity period.137 In turn, commensurate with the brandname drug’s decline in drug sales is its manufacturer’s waning incentive to
vigilantly warn of ongoing and future side effects.138 Indeed, this incentive
deficit is a natural offshoot of the brand name’s substantially reduced market
share, which translates to an equally reduced threat of consumer litigation.139
Thus, once the brand-name drug’s exclusivity protection ends, its
manufacturer is under little financial incentive to carefully research and warn
of new risks that flow from its drug.140
Some courts have found that one way to cure this incentive problem is to
recognize a duty of care between brand-name manufacturers and generic
users.141 The Rafferty court reasoned that if it were to recognize duty,
thereby paving the way for generic users to bring failure-to-warn claims
against brand-name manufacturers, then the brand name would have a
considerable financial incentive to continuously update its warning label
even when its monopoly had ceased.142 The court opined that this would
make for sound public policy because stronger warnings on brand-name
drugs would have a trickle-down effect on generic-drug labels, and this
trickle-down effect would enhance the overall safety of prescription drug use
throughout the industry.143
The Novartis and Rafferty courts also contended that replenishing the
financial incentive to warn was of heightened importance because the brandname manufacturer is the only authority, under PLIVA, that can unilaterally
strengthen prescription drug warning labels.144 Thus, without a sufficient
incentive to warn, the whole industry could suffer from underwarning
because generic manufacturers are also immune from failure-to-warn
135. See Novartis, 407 P.3d at 31; Rafferty v. Merck & Co., 92 N.E.3d 1205, 1217 (Mass.
2018).
136. Rafferty, 92 N.E.3d at 1216; see also DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note
125, at 2 (“88 percent of dispensed prescriptions are for generic drugs . . . .”).
137. See Rafferty, 92 N.E.3d at 1217; DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 125,
at 14.
138. See Rafferty, 92 N.E.3d at 1217.
139. See id.
140. See id. Note, however, that under federal law, brand-name manufacturers are already
under an obligation to continuously research and warn of potential side effects. See T.H. v.
Novartis Pharm. Corp, 407 P.3d 18, 32 (Cal. 2017); Schwartz et al., supra note 48, at 1844.
141. See Novartis, 407 P.3d at 31; Rafferty, 92 N.E.3d at 1217.
142. See Rafferty, 92 N.E.3d at 1217.
143. See id.
144. See id.; see also Novartis, 407 P.3d at 32.
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liability.145 Indeed, the Rafferty court made this concern abundantly clear
when it stated that “no one—neither the generic manufacturer nor the brandname manufacturer—would have a complete incentive to maintain safe
labels.”146 Therefore, it found that recognizing a duty of care would help
effectuate the prudent public policy of incentivizing adequate prescription
drug warning throughout the industry.147
b. “A Right Without a Remedy”
The other major public policy served by recognizing a duty of care is the
avenue of legal recourse it would provide for injured generic users in
As stated before, generic
vindicating the harms they suffered.148
manufacturers are currently immunized from failure-to-warn liability,
meaning injured generic users cannot bring suit against the manufacturers of
their drugs.149 Therefore, the only viable option left is for generic users to
bring suit against the brand-name manufacturer.150 Against this backdrop,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court expressed concern that its finding
of no duty would, in effect, foreclose the last opportunity for generic
plaintiffs to obtain legal relief for their injuries.151 This concern is certainly
plausible given that nearly 90 percent of all prescription drug consumers are
generic-drug users.152 Accordingly, to find no duty of care would in essence
shut out 90 percent of all prescription drug consumers from any means of
legal redress should they suffer adverse side effects.153 Therefore, while the
Rafferty court believed this “a right without a remedy” argument did not, by
itself, establish a duty of care, it nevertheless found it to be a compelling
public policy consideration.154

145. See Rafferty, 92 N.E.3d at 1217–18.
146. Id. at 1217. Some brand-name defendants have argued in response that imposing a
duty of care will lead to overwarning of side effects, which will “dilute the effectiveness of
any individual warning.” But see Novartis, 407 P.3d at 33 (rejecting this overwarning
argument).
147. See Rafferty, 92 N.E.3d at 1217–18.
148. See id. at 1218.
149. See supra Part II.A.
150. See Rafferty, 92 N.E.3d at 1218.
151. See id.
152. See PHRMA, BIOPHARMACEUTICALS IN PERSPECTIVE 1, 49 (2017), http://phrmadocs.phrma.org/files/dmfile/Biopharmaceuticals-in-Perspective-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3SBW-JCNJ].
153. See id.
154. It is important to observe that imposing a duty of care does not necessarily provide
legal compensation to injured generic plaintiffs. Also note that this public policy argument
has not been embraced by many courts in finding a duty of care; indeed, as this Note’s
discussion indicates, only the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court seemingly accounted for
this policy interest in reaching its conclusion. One hypothesis for why this argument has not
gained traction in the case law is that it falls prey to the opposition’s argument that “[d]eeppocket jurisprudence is law without principle.” See Schwartz et al., supra note 48, at 1844.
Likewise, this Note does not rely on this argument to advance its position.
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B. Key Arguments Undergirding the No Duty Position
The majority position, as reflected in the case law, is the position that
manufacturers of brand-name drugs do not owe a duty of care to generic
users.155 Embedded within this position are various arguments—advanced
by courts, brand-name defendants, and commentators alike—that provide a
smattering of tort doctrine, public policy, and general legal principles.
Among them, this Note identifies and discusses the emblematic arguments
undergirding the no duty position.
This section begins by examining the argument that negligence suits by
generic plaintiffs are an end run around strict products liability claims that
cannot proceed due to lack of causation. This section then discusses the
doctrinal arguments for finding no duty and concludes with an analysis of the
key public policy considerations put forth by duty opponents.
1. Negligence Is an End Run Around Strict Products Liability
Duty opponents have argued that failure-to-warn negligence suits brought
by generic users against brand-name defendants are merely an end run around
strict products liability law that should be prohibited.156 Strict products
liability jurisprudence traces its origins to section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, which advocated a new theory of liability—strict
liability—borne by manufacturers for injuries caused by their products’
defects.157 The Restatement’s rationale for this liability was grounded in
fairness: a seller should assume responsibility for harms caused by its own
product.158 Another rationale was public policy, as sellers were thought to
be in the best position to compensate their injured users by absorbing such
costs as the price of doing business.159 Thus, for a plaintiff to assert a strict
products liability claim, Restatement section 402A required proof of
causation: the plaintiff must prove that her alleged injury was caused by the
defendant’s product.160
These core principles of fairness and public policy have, in turn, provided
a substantial justification for shielding brand-name manufacturers from

155. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 169–70 (4th Cir. 1994);
Couick v. Wyeth, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 2d 643, 645 (W.D.N.C. 2010) (“While the plaintiff’s
claims are masked in various legal theories, they are premised on a single claim of product
liability.”); Stoddard v. Wyeth, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 2d 631, 633 (E.D.N.C. 2009) (“Although
cloaked in different theories for recovery, plaintiffs’ claims are nevertheless product liability
claims.”); Huck v. Wyeth, Inc., 850 N.W.2d 353, 373 (Iowa 2014); see also Schwartz et al.,
supra note 48, at 1860–61.
157. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
158. See id. (justifying strict liability on the rationale that a product’s seller “has undertaken
and assumed a special responsibility toward” its user); see also Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 378
(holding that products liability law “place[s] responsibility for the harm caused by a product”
because the manufacturer profited from it).
159. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see also
Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 376; McNair v. Johnson & Johnson, 818 S.E.2d 852, 866 (W. Va. 2018).
160. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
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liability for failure to warn generic plaintiffs.161 The argument’s starting
point is that generic users are precluded from bringing strict products liability
actions against brand-name manufacturers because their injuries flow from a
generic drug, not the brand-name drug.162 But, in addition, opponents of duty
further argue that the same rationales precluding generic users from asserting
strict products liability claims apply equally and with the same effect to
negligence claims brought against the brand-name defendant.163 This can be
appropriately referred to as the “end run” argument because it essentially
views generic users’ failure-to-warn claims as an end run around traditional
strict products liability.
The crux of the end run argument is that permitting the generic user to get
a second bite at the apple through a negligence suit frustrates the narrowly
confined and carefully crafted parameters of strict products liability.164
Implicit here is the premise that strict products liability is the exclusive form
of liability for product defects under tort law; thus, generic users’ negligence
suits perpetuate an impermissible circumvention around section 402A.165
Indeed, when viewed in a vacuum, permitting the end run presents an
inherently uncomfortable proposition by requiring one manufacturer—the
brand name—to potentially absorb the liability costs of its competitors.166
In addition, courts have also found that allowing generic users’ failure-towarn claims to proceed based on the technical distinction that they sound in
negligence, rather than strict products liability, would also frustrate strict
products liability’s core public policy aim of limiting a manufacturer’s
liability to harm caused by only its own products.167 As the McNair court
observed, brand-name manufacturers “cannot spread the cost of
compensating generic consumers” because they do not market or profit from
the generic drug’s sale.168 Thus, the argument holds that the brand name is
not best situated to absorb the burdens of liability for injuries caused by
generic drugs.169
Numerous state legislatures have taken steps to prevent the end run around
strict products liability by enacting products liability statutes.170 Products
liability statutes collapse all claims alleging harm from a defective product,
regardless of the theory of liability, under the unitary heading of “product
161. See Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 376; McNair, 818 S.E.2d at 866.
162. See McNair, 818 S.E.2d at 866 (rejecting generic plaintiff’s strict products liability
claim for lack of causation).
163. See, e.g., Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 376; McNair, 818 S.E.2d at 866.
164. See Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 376; McNair, 818 S.E.2d at 866.
165. See Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 376; McNair, 818 S.E.2d at 866.
166. Commentators have, in fact, viewed this proposition to be in tension with the basic
spirit of products liability law, which is to place liability flowing from a product’s defects on
the manufacturer of that particular product. Schwartz et al., supra note 48, at 1844.
167. See Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 170 (4th Cir. 1994) (“We also
reject the contention that a name brand manufacturer’s statements regarding its drug can serve
as the basis for liability for injuries caused by another manufacturer’s drug.”).
168. McNair, 818 S.E.2d at 866.
169. See id.
170. Twenty-five states have products liability statutes. See Schwartz et al., supra note 48,
at 1861.
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liability action.”171 In turn, courts have interpreted these statutes to require
proof of causation for any claim arising out of a defective product.172 This
practice has indeed proven fatal to generic plaintiffs’ negligence suits
because generic users, by definition, cannot prove that the brand-name
manufacturer caused their injuries.173 As a result, many courts applying
products liability statutes to generic users’ failure-to-warn claims do not even
go so far as to entertain the duty question because they can dispose the case
on statutory grounds.174 Thus, these statutes provide courts with a powerful
tool—causation—to sidestep the duty question and thereby render the
generic user’s claim a nonstarter.
To summarize, proponents of the end run argument view generic users’
failure-to-warn claims to be in conflict with core principles underlying strict
products liability, and they further contend that such claims amount to
nothing more than a circumvention of strict products liability law that ought
not be sanctioned. At the same time, state products liability statutes give
courts the means to stop this end run effect and rid their dockets of generic
users’ failure-to-warn claims. While this may certainly incur collateral
costs—for example, shutting injured generic users out from legal redress—
such costs nevertheless take a backseat to the more egregious end run effect
which takes precedence.175
2. Doctrinal Arguments Weighing Against Duty
Courts and brand-name defendants have argued in the alternative that,
even if generic users’ failure-to-warn claims are truly distinct and are not
merely an end run around strict products liability, these claims still cannot
171. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.300(1) (West 2018) (“[A] ‘product liability
action’ shall include any action brought for or on account of personal injury . . . caused by or
resulting from the manufacture . . . of any product.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-8 (West
2019) (“‘Product liability action’ means any claim or action brought by a claimant for harm
caused by a product, irrespective of the theory underlying the claim . . . .”).
172. See, e.g., Lashley v. Pfizer, Inc., 750 F.3d 470, 476–77 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that,
under Mississippi and Texas statutes, the plaintiff must establish that his injuries were caused
by the defendant’s product to proceed with failure-to-warn claims); Franzman v. Wyeth, Inc.,
451 S.W.3d 676, 690 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014) (“To succeed on a product liability claim under
[the Kentucky product liability statute] . . . a plaintiff must show that the defendant’s product
is the legal cause of her injuries.”). Some states have folded negligence into strict products
liability by requiring proof of causation even without a state statute. See, e.g., Guarino v.
Wyeth, LLC, 719 F.3d 1245, 1251 (11th Cir. 2013) (requiring the plaintiffs to prove causation
under Florida common law); Huck v. Wyeth, Inc., 850 N.W.2d 353, 371 (Iowa 2014) (finding
that, under Iowa common law, a plaintiff must establish causation to proceed with failure-towarn claims against a defendant).
173. See, e.g., Demahy v. Schwarz Pharm. Inc., 702 F.3d 177, 182 (5th Cir. 2012) (applying
the Louisiana product liability statute and dismissing generic users’ failure-to-warn claims);
Smith v. Wyeth, Inc., 657 F.3d 420, 423–24 (6th Cir. 2011) (applying the Kentucky statute to
dismiss claims).
174. See, e.g., Lashley, 750 F.3d at 476–77 (applying a products liability statute and not
addressing the negligence duty question).
175. See Guarino, 719 F.3d at 1253 (prioritizing the causation argument over providing a
remedy to generic users); McNair v. Johnson & Johnson, 818 S.E.2d 852, 866 (W. Va. 2018)
(same).

2234

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

proceed to trial because brand-name manufacturers do not owe a duty of care
to generic users.176 At its base, the claim is that brand-name manufacturers
owe a duty to warn of adverse side effects only to the users of its products
and no one else.177 Although courts have fashioned their no duty findings
predominantly on a public policy rationale—which is examined in the next
section—they have also advanced a number of doctrinal arguments.
First, courts have reasoned that recognizing a duty of care between brandname manufacturers and generic users would “stretch the concept of
foreseeability too far.”178 In Foster v. American Home Products Corp.,179
the Fourth Circuit authored this famous line and declined to recognize a duty
of care; however, the court failed to adequately explain what it is about
recognizing a duty of care that stretches the doctrinal principle of
foreseeability too far.180 And although subsequent courts have latched onto
this argument when concluding no duty, they have not adequately analyzed
its meaning or effect.181
A proper reading of the Fourth Circuit’s argument is in order. In
articulating its “foreseeability stretched too far” proposition, the Fourth
Circuit was not arguing it was unforeseeable that generic users would rely on
brand-name drug warning labels.182 Quite the contrary, the court
acknowledged that foreseeability cut for the generic user, but it nevertheless
downplayed the significance of foreseeability in its analysis.183 As evidence
of this, the Fourth Circuit’s opinion pivoted from discussing foreseeability to
examining privity and reasoned that the absence of privity between generic
users and brand-name manufacturers justified its conclusion.184 Thus, while
foreseeability is relevant to the duty analysis, to find it dispositive would
“stretch” the concept of foreseeability too far,185 and therefore, courts should
176. See, e.g., Strayhorn v. Wyeth Pharm., Inc., 737 F.3d 378, 405 (6th Cir. 2013); Foster
v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 171 (4th Cir. 1994); Simpson v. Wyeth, Inc., No.
7:10-cv-01771-HGD, 2010 WL 5485812, at *5 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 9, 2010); PLIVA, Inc. v.
Dement, 780 S.E.2d 735, 743 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015) (holding under Georgia tort law that a
manufacturer’s duty of care only extends to users of its products); Huck v. Wyeth, Inc., 850
N.W.2d 353, 371 (Iowa 2014); McNair, 818 S.E.2d at 866.
177. See, e.g., Strayhorn, 737 F.3d at 405 (holding that, under Tennessee law, a product
manufacturer owes a duty of care to only its own users, not another product’s users); Foster,
29 F.3d at 171; Dement, 780 S.E.2d at 743 (holding that, under Georgia tort law, a
manufacturer’s duty only extends to users of its product); Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 371; McNair,
818 S.E.2d at 866.
178. Foster, 29 F.3d at 171; see also In re Darvocet, Darvon, & Propoxyphene Prods. Liab.
Litig., 756 F.3d 917, 944 (6th Cir. 2014); Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 727 F.3d 1273, 1285 (10th
Cir. 2013); Chatman v. Pfizer, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 2d 641, 656 (S.D. Miss. 2013); Huck, 850
N.W.2d at 370; Stanley v. Wyeth, Inc., 991 So. 2d 31, 34 (La. Ct. App. 2008); McNair, 818
S.E.2d at 862.
179. 29 F.3d 165 (4th Cir. 1994).
180. See id. at 171.
181. See, e.g., In re Darvocet, 756 F.3d at 944; Schrock, 727 F.3d at 1285; Chatman, 960
F. Supp. 2d at 656; Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 370; Stanley, 991 So. 2d at 34; McNair, 818 S.E.2d
at 862.
182. See Foster, 29 F.3d at 171.
183. See id.
184. See id. (declining to recognize a duty of care because of the lack of privity).
185. See id.
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judiciously factor in countervailing considerations when deciding the duty
element.186 The Fourth Circuit’s rebuttal of foreseeability is often construed
by citing courts as an open invitation to afford generous weight to policy
rationales that favor a finding of no duty.187
Second, courts have held that manufacturers of brand-name drugs do not
owe a duty of care to generic users because they only “intend to
communicate” with their own consumers.188 In practice, this contention has
primarily been used to rebuff generic plaintiffs who pursue claims on the tort
of negligent misrepresentation.189
One rationale underlying the recognition of the tort of negligent
misrepresentation is based on equity or fairness: a party “who negligently
gives false information to another is subject to liability for physical harm
caused by action taken by the other in reasonable reliance on such
information.”190 Thus, the tort generally requires a showing of reasonable
reliance by the injured party in order to give rise to a cause of action.191
Consequently, courts have found reasonable reliance to be the Achilles’ heel
of generic users’ negligent misrepresentation claims because brand-name
manufacturers only endeavor to warn their own users of adverse side effects,
not the entire market.192 Privity thus establishes the parameters of reasonable
reliance on brand-name warning labels, and since generic users lie outside
the scope of privity, their efforts to prove reasonable reliance are
unavailing.193
186. See T.H. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 407 P.3d 18, 28 (Cal. 2017) (“To determine . . .
duty . . . we balance [a] constellation of factors . . . .”); Sharp v. Leichus, No. 2004-CA-0643,
2006 WL 515532, at *7 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 17, 2006) (“[A]lthough foreseeability is clearly
relevant to the existence of a duty . . . ‘duty is not established by . . . foreseeability alone.’”
(quoting Hernandez v. Tallahassee Med. Ctr., Inc., 896 So. 2d 839, 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2005))). A proper understanding of the Fourth Circuit’s argument is necessary to avoid
misconstruing which way foreseeability cuts in the duty analysis. Indeed, one can erroneously
construe the Fourth Circuit’s argument to mean that the risk of harm to generic users is
unforeseeable. This Note, however, views such an interpretation to be mistaken and, more
plainly, an indefensible position. See infra Part IV.A.
187. See, e.g., Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 727 F.3d 1273, 1285 (10th Cir. 2013); Huck v.
Wyeth, Inc., 850 N.W.2d 353, 370 (Iowa 2014); McNair v. Johnson & Johnson, 818 S.E.2d
852, 862 (W. Va. 2018) (recognizing foreseeability as one consideration but declining to find
that the brand-name defendant owed a duty of care in light of “broader policy considerations”).
188. See Schrock, 727 F.3d at 1285; Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603, 613 n.9 (8th
Cir. 2009); Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 371; Stanley v. Wyeth, Inc., 991 So. 2d 31, 34–35 (La. Ct.
App. 2008).
189. See, e.g., Schrock, 727 F.3d at 1283; Mensing, 588 F.3d at 613 (holding that negligent
misrepresentation requires “direct communication”); Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 371; Stanley, 991
So. 2d at 33.
190. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see also id. § 311
cmt. b; cf. Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 371 (limiting the tort of negligent misrepresentation to sellers
in the business of disseminating information).
191. See Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 391; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (AM. LAW
INST. 1965).
192. See, e.g., Schrock, 727 F.3d at 1282–83; Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d
165, 171 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding that generic users had no basis to justify reliance); Huck, 850
N.W.2d at 391; Stanley, 991 So. 2d at 33–34.
193. See Schrock, 727 F.3d at 1285; Mensing, 588 F.3d at 613 n.9; Foster, 29 F.3d at 170;
Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 377; Stanley, 991 So. 2d at 34.
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The other rationale—fairness—also does not translate well given that
brand-name manufacturers do not further any self-interest by having generic
users rely on their warning labels.194 Therefore, the argument runs, it is
inappropriate to impose a duty of care where the brand-name manufacturer
neither intends to communicate with the generic user nor benefits from the
generic user’s reliance on its drug’s warning label.195
Third, courts have argued that recognizing a duty is unfair to brand-name
manufacturers because they retain “no control” over the generic
manufacturer’s product.196 The central premise underlying this argument is
that a party’s liability is limited to that which it has control over.197 Likewise,
brand-name manufacturers do not market, manufacture, or provide warning
labels for generic drugs, meaning they have no control over the generic
drug’s quality or pharmaceutical safety.198 Therefore, courts have declined
to find a duty of care where the brand-name manufacturer clearly lacked
control over the generic drug.199
Finally, some commentators and courts have confronted the foreseeability
argument head-on by arguing that the generic user’s injury is not a
foreseeable consequence of the brand’s conduct but merely a foreseeable
outcome of federal law.200 That is, the risk of harm to generic users generated
by inadequate warning labels is purely a product of federal law and not the
brand’s own doing.201 Thus, a rule that obliges brand-name defendants to
pick up the liability tabs of competitors because of a federal regulatory
scheme completely out of their control contravenes basic notions of justice
and puts the generic user’s injury outside the scope of foreseeability.

194. See Mosley v. Wyeth, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1346 (S.D. Ala. 2010) (finding
negligent misrepresentation claims to be limited to sellers of information such as real estate
appraisers and accountants); Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 372 (noting that negligent
misrepresentation claims are limited to sellers of information in the business of supplying
information).
195. See Schrock, 727 F.3d at 1285; Foster, 29 F.3d at 170; Mosley, 719 F. Supp. 2d at
1346; Huck 850 N.W.2d at 372.
196. Foster, 29 F.3d at 170; see Schrock, 727 F.3d at 1285; Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 378.
197. See Schrock, 727 F.3d at 1285; Foster, 29 F.3d at 170; Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 378.
198. See Schrock, 727 F.3d at 1285; Foster, 29 F.3d at 170; Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 378
(stating that the brand-name manufacturer played no part in placing the generic drug in the
stream of commerce or controlling its pharmaceutical safety).
199. See Schrock, 727 F.3d at 1285; Foster, 29 F.3d at 170; Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 378. One
interesting argument generic plaintiffs have made, albeit unsuccessfully, is that the brandname manufacturer voluntarily undertook a duty of care to generic users by promulgating its
warning label. See, e.g., Swicegood v. PLIVA, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1356 (N.D. Ga.
2008) (rejecting the plaintiff’s “Good Samaritan” duty argument).
200. See In re Darvocet, Darvon, & Propoxyphene Prods. Liab. Litig., 756 F.3d 917, 944
(6th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he generic consumers’ injuries are not the foreseeable result of the brand
manufacturers’ conduct, but of the laws over which the brand manufacturers have no
control.”); McNair v. Johnson & Johnson, 818 S.E.2d 852, 862 (W. Va. 2018); see also
Schwartz et al., supra note 48, at 1865 (arguing that federal law creates the foreseeable harm,
not the brand-name manufacturer’s conduct).
201. See In re Darvocet, 756 F.3d at 944; McNair, 818 S.E.2d at 862; see also Schwartz et
al., supra note 48, at 1865.
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3. Public Policy Concerns Weighing Against Duty
In finding no duty of care, various state and federal courts have relied
substantially on public policy considerations.202 Furthermore, the high
courts of Iowa and West Virginia have given these policy considerations
great weight.203 Indeed, this cost-benefit approach to duty rests on the belief
that the duty element’s metaphysical purpose is to draw definite lines on tort
liability,204 and thus, because the benefits of recognizing a duty of care
between brand-name manufacturers and generic users are outweighed by the
costs, no duty ought to be recognized. Having already examined the policy
virtues of a duty of care,205 this Part now turns to the major public policy
considerations undergirding the opposite position.
a. Recognizing Duty Will Open the Floodgates
Courts have held that imposing liability on brand-name manufacturers for
generic users’ injuries would turn them into de facto general insurers of the
generic-drug market.206 This fear of opening the floodgates of liability has,
in turn, nudged courts to reject a duty of care.207 To their credit, the
floodgates concern is not merely hypothetical but, indeed, plausible:
according to one study, nearly 70 percent of Americans will at some point in
their lives consume prescription drugs, and, of this massive figure, roughly
2460 people will die each week of harmful side effects.208 Given the sheer
size of the prescription drug market and the number of potential plaintiffs—
202. See, e.g., Schrock, 727 F.3d at 1285; Sharp v. Leichus, No. 2004-CA-0643, 2006 WL
515532, at *7 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 17, 2006); Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 378; McNair, 818 S.E.2d at
862. Courts ruling in favor of duty have also assessed the public policy considerations cutting
against this finding. See, e.g., Kellogg v. Wyeth, 762 F. Supp. 2d 694, 706 (D. Vt. 2010)
(recognizing a duty of care, under Vermont law, on foreseeability grounds despite public
policy arguments to the contrary); Rafferty v. Merck & Co., 92 N.E.3d 1205, 1220 (Mass.
2018).
203. See, e.g., Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 380; McNair, 818 S.E.2d at 865 (holding that tort law
is “a question of public policy” that the court should clearly delineate limits on liability). But
see Rafferty, 92 N.E.3d at 1220 (holding that generic plaintiffs do not have a negligence cause
of action but can claim recklessness after balancing policy considerations).
204. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 31, at 180 (1941)
(“‘[D]uty’ is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those
considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to
protection.”). For a critique of this view, see generally John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C.
Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733 (1998).
205. See supra Part III.A.2.
206. See, e.g., Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 380; McNair, 818 S.E.2d at 863. But see T.H. v.
Novartis Pharm. Corp., 407 P.3d 18, 32 (Cal. 2017) (arguing that recognizing a duty of care
does not impose any additional burden on brand-name manufacturers).
207. See Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 380; McNair, 818 S.E.2d at 863. In addition to the
floodgates issue, some argue that to recognize a duty and expose the brand-name manufacturer
to generic liability perpetuates unfairness because the generic manufacturer takes advantage
of the brand name’s marketing, research, and development while also shifting liability to the
brand name. See Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 169–70 (4th Cir. 1994).
208. See Michael O. Schroeder, Death by Prescription, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept.
27, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://health.usnews.com/health-news/patient-advice/articles/2016-0927/the-danger-in-taking-prescribed-medications [https://perma.cc/C6C8-4WM2].
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roughly 2460 new candidates each week209—duty opponents argue that the
brand-name manufacturer would be exposed to far too much liability and far
too high litigation costs were courts to impose on them a duty of care to
generic users.210 Thus, to prevent this form of liability without limits, many
courts have held no duty of care as a matter of law and effectively put the
brakes on generic users’ claims before they even get to trial.211
Nestled in the public policy discussion is also an institutional competency
argument that lends support to the no duty position.212 In declining to
recognize a duty of care, some courts have espoused the view that the
judiciary is ill-equipped to adequately assess the broader public policy
ramifications of recognizing a duty of care.213 In a nutshell, this argument
asserts that because the potential liability attached to recognizing duty is
great, the judiciary ought to refrain from finding duty and pass the buck to
the political branches, which possess institutional advantages in tailoring
liability in order to avert a potential floodgates problem.214 This belief was
succinctly expressed by the Supreme Court of Iowa when it observed that
“courts are not institutionally qualified to balance the complex, interrelated,
and divergent policy considerations in determining . . . liability obligations
of brand and generic pharmaceuticals.”215
Another floodgates concern is the “spillover effect” it could have on other
factual situations. In Huck, the Supreme Court of Iowa contended that, if it
were to impose a duty of care between brand-name manufacturers and
generic users, then it would similarly have to find duty in every other case
where one company “mimics” the designs of another company.216 In
articulating this spillover concern, the court referred to a vital premise
underlying the no duty position: a manufacturer is only liable for the injuries
caused by its own product, not the products of its competitors.217

209. See id.
210. See Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 380; McNair, 818 S.E.2d at 863.
211. See Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 380; McNair, 818 S.E.2d at 863. In addition to the pragmatic
justification of preventing boundless litigation, some have gone further and argued that this
kind of excessive liability conflicts with a basic value underlying tort law: to protect free
enterprise and to create a climate of economic prosperity. See Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, 159
So. 3d 649, 684 (Ala. 2014) (Murdock, J., dissenting) (“An enterprising spirit alone, however,
is not enough. The law must protect the fruits of enterprise and create a climate in which trade
and business innovation can flourish.”).
212. See Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 377; McNair, 818 S.E.2d at 866–67 (stating that courts
should not interfere with congressional policy choices).
213. See Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 377; McNair, 818 S.E.2d at 866–67.
214. See Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 377; McNair, 818 S.E.2d at 866–67.
215. Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 377. The institutional competency argument has also served an
additional function in addressing the injustice of leaving injured generic users without legal
redress. See Guarino v. Wyeth, LLC, 719 F.3d 1245, 1253 (11th Cir. 2013); McNair, 818
S.E.2d at 866. Although ruling that there is no duty of care leaves the injured generic user
without any remedy, courts contend that the ultimate solution should be determined by
Congress or the FDA, not the judiciary. See Guarino, 719 F.3d at 1253; McNair, 818 S.E.2d
at 866.
216. Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 380.
217. See id. at 380–81.
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b. Imposing Duty Could Chill Innovation
The other significant public policy consideration undergirding the no duty
position is the prospect of chilling prescription drug innovation.218 In the last
quarter century, breakthroughs in prescription pharmaceuticals have
advanced effective treatments for diseases such as “HIV/AIDS, cancer, and
heart disease,” among many others.219 Indeed, this impressive track record
affirms the social desirability of drug innovation and corroborates the need
for further breakthroughs in the prescription drug industry.
Given the valuable purposes prescription drugs serve, there are those who
have argued that future medicinal innovations will be stymied if brand-name
manufacturers are asked to shoulder the tort liability of their generic
competitors.220 This argument is particularly persuasive in light of the
complex and expensive federal regulatory process that already stymies
successful prescription drug innovation.221 Indeed, after accounting for
research and development and navigation of the FDA approval process222 the
cost of innovation rises to the billions.223 In addition, the substantial risk of
denial by the FDA makes prescription drug innovation an inherently
precarious venture.224
Understandably then, courts have been reluctant to impose additional costs
on brand-name manufacturers out of concern that this imposition may chill
prescription drug innovation.225 This judicial posture has, in turn, laid the
groundwork for rejecting a duty of care between brand-name manufacturers
and generic users, as courts have reasoned that the additional burden of
compensating generic users—when added to the already high transaction
costs of drug innovation—may be enough for brand name C-suites across the
country to halt drug innovation altogether.226 Thus, imposing duty promotes
218. See Rafferty v. Merck & Co., 92 N.E.3d 1205, 1215 (Mass. 2018) (holding that public
policy favors marketing new and effective drugs).
219. See PHRMA, supra note 152, at 3.
220. See Richard A. Epstein, Legal Liability for Medical Innovation, 8 CARDOZO L. REV.
1139, 1153–54 (1987) (“If in the aggregate the net gains are wiped out by the liability costs,
then the product will no longer be made.”); Schwartz et al., supra note 48, at 1879. But see
STEVEN GARBER, RAND INST. FOR CIV. JUSTICE, ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF PRODUCT LIABILITY
AND OTHER LITIGATION INVOLVING THE SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF PHARMACEUTICALS 62
(2013), https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1259.html [https://perma.cc/BNE563RF] (stating that there is “no reliable empirical basis” for determining the effect of products
liability on drug innovation).
221. See Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2471 (2013).
222. The FDA approval process takes, on average, ten to fifteen years. See Rafferty, 92
N.E.3d at 1217.
223. See Schwartz et al., supra note 48, at 1842; see also PHRMA, supra note 152, at 29.
224. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-564, INVESTIGATIONAL NEW
DRUGS 14 (2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/685729.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2FS4HP5] (finding that fewer than one in ten prescription applications are ultimately approved by
the FDA).
225. See, e.g., Huck v. Wyeth, Inc., 850 N.W.2d 353, 377 (Iowa 2014); Rafferty v. Merck
& Co., 92 N.E.3d 1205, 1217 (Mass. 2018); McNair v. Johnson & Johnson, 818 S.E.2d 852,
866 (W. Va. 2018).
226. See Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 377; McNair, 818 S.E.2d at 866; see also Schwartz et al.,
supra note 48, at 1842.
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unsound public policy because of the potential chilling effect it could have
on future pharmaceutical innovations.227
In conclusion, as this Part illustrates, there are meritorious arguments
supporting each side of the duty issue. Understandable, then, is the current
reality that courts remain deeply divided on this question.228 With this in
mind, this Note now turns to its own remedial approach for courts to apply
in addressing whether there exists a duty of care from brand-name
manufacturers to generic users.
IV. RESOLUTION
This Note contends that a duty of care exists between brand-name
manufacturers and injured generic users and that this duty, in essence,
generates an obligation on the brand name to take reasonable care in
adequately warning generic users of adverse side effects. In taking this
stance, this Note conceptualizes the duty element of negligence law as a
normative obligation that flows from one class of persons to another by virtue
of the context in which those persons find themselves situated.229
Appropriately then, the job of the court is to probe the factual circumstances
in which a given relationship exists in the category of cases at issue and—
based on that initial inquiry—to articulate a decision on whether tort law
ought to recognize a duty of care.230
Yet, in the same breath, this Note also acknowledges the countervailing
Prosserian view of duty adopted by many courts: that, at its core, duty is a
question of public policy.231 Using this framework, some commentators232
and courts have concluded that prudent policy in the context of brand-name
manufacturers and generic users warrants a no duty conclusion.
Large philosophical issues of how to think about the duty element in
negligence law, however, need not be addressed here233 because whichever
framework is selected, there is a way for courts to recognize a duty of care
between brand-name manufacturers and generic users. That is, courts can
227. See Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 377; McNair, 818 S.E.2d at 866. The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court found the chill on innovation to be particularly worrisome because
the liability from generic users would only arise when the brand-name manufacturer’s
exclusivity period had ended, whereupon it would barely profit from its drug. See Rafferty, 92
N.E.3d at 1216. The court also expressed concern over the fact that the liability could continue
“indefinitely” and could thus shroud the brand-name manufacturer’s financial future in
uncertainty. See id.
228. See supra Part II.A.
229. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916) (holding that
there was no duty of care by examining features of the litigants’ relationship); see also
Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 204, at 1819 (analyzing MacPherson).
230. See MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053; see also Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 204, at
1819.
231. See PROSSER, supra note 204, § 31, at 180 (“‘[D]uty’ is not sacrosanct in itself, but
only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say
that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.”).
232. See generally Schwartz et al., supra note 48.
233. This Note leaves this important issue to the Calabresis and Zipurskys of the academic
world to debate and resolve.
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impose a duty of care on brand-name manufacturers and still retain fidelity
to both public policy concerns and doctrinal considerations. This remedial
position—which Part IV.B discusses at length—rests on two fundamental
planks.
First and foremost, the history of tort law and circumstances unique to the
brand-name, generic-user relationship provide compelling arguments for
recognizing a duty of care. This is the doctrinal plank. Second, in
recognizing duty, courts are institutionally equipped to address the public
policy concerns embedded in the duty question because of their core
competence in crafting tort law. This is the public policy plank.
Prior to that discussion, however, this Note does not turn a blind eye to the
existing no duty arguments found in the case law. As a token of respect for
those arguments’ validity, this Part begins by rebutting the key arguments
advanced by courts in support of no duty.
A. Rebutting the No Duty Arguments
This section rebuts the end run argument and doctrinal considerations
undergirding the no duty position in the case law. The public policy
discussion is reserved for Part IV.B.
1. The Negligence Cause of Action Has No End Run Effect
Duty opponents’ argument that generic users’ negligence suits are a mere
end run around strict products liability is unpersuasive for several reasons.234
First, this contention rests on the implicit assumption that strict products
liability limits manufacturer liability because it forecloses the negligence
cause of action. That assumption, however, profoundly misconstrues the role
of strict products liability in tort law. Strict products liability, as it originated
and developed in the common law, did not set out to supplant traditional
theories of tort liability against manufacturers but rather to create an
additional pocket of liability based on the closeness of the buyer-seller
relationship.235 This original intent is thus interpreted to mean that section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts is a sword to inflict more liability
on corporate America, not a shield to protect it from conventional theories of
tort liability.236 Indeed, by wielding strict products liability as a shield
against negligence, it is the brand-name defendant, and not the generic user,
who promotes an inequitable end run effect: the brand wrongly uses strict
products liability as an end run around traditional negligence law to limit its
own liability.
234. See supra notes 156–75 and accompanying text.
235. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 461–62 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring) (finding that public policy establishes the need for greater protection than
negligence in the seller-buyer relationship); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c
(AM. LAW INST. 1965) (justifying strict liability on the rationale that a product’s seller “has
undertaken and assumed a special responsibility toward” its user).
236. See Escola, 150 P.2d at 461–62; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c
(AM. LAW INST. 1965).
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Second, the end run argument fails in another respect because there is, in
fact, a plausible distinction between strict liability and negligence in the
failure-to-warn context.237 As a threshold matter, it is undisputed that
consumers of brand-name drugs are owed a greater duty of care than what is
owed to generic users. This is the case because brand-name users directly
transact, rely upon, and ultimately ingest the brand-name manufacturer’s
product. Accordingly, these circumstances create an inextricable nexus—the
seller-buyer relationship—that generates the highest duty of vigilance to
provide adequate warning labels. And indeed, in acknowledging this special
relationship, tort law permits brand-name users to succeed on failure-to-warn
claims on a strict liability theory, thereby allowing plaintiffs to prevail at trial
without having to prove fault or negligence.238 But there is a catch: to unlock
this special privilege, tort law requires that the brand-name user establish that
her injuries were caused by the brand-name drug.239
Generic users, in contrast, do not have the power to claim liability without
fault because they cannot prove causation, meaning they are confined to
bringing failure-to-warn claims, sounding in negligence, against the brandname defendant.240 Such claims are distinct from their strict products
liability siblings because they require a showing of actual fault under the
breach element to prevail at trial. To meet this fault element, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that the brand-name manufacturer negligently
promulgated its warning label and that this act of negligence constituted a
breach of the duty of care owed to the generic user.241 Against this backdrop,
it makes little sense to require the generic user to prove causation by the
brand-name product because her suit claims negligence—not strict products
liability—as the basis for liability.
Paradoxically, a telling symptom of the end run argument’s flaws is the
leading no duty case, McNair. As discussed in Part II.C, the Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia held in McNair that the generic plaintiffs were
barred from bringing strict products liability claims against the brand-name
defendant due to a lack of causation.242 The court, however, then proceeded
to part two of its analysis, where it separately addressed the plaintiffs’
negligence claims and concluded that there was no duty based on public

237. See Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, 159 So. 3d 649, 670 (Ala. 2014) (finding that precedents
confused strict liability with other areas of tort law); T.H. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 407 P.3d
18, 37 (Cal. 2017) (holding that California tort law does not conflate strict liability and
negligence law); Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 299, 310 (Ct. App. 2008) (“Negligence
and strict products liability are separate and distinct bases for liability that do not automatically
collapse into each other . . . .”).
238. See, e.g., McNair v. Johnson & Johnson, 818 S.E.2d 852, 860–61 (W. Va. 2018)
(holding that strict products liability requires the defendant to be the manufacturer of the
defective product).
239. See id.
240. See id.
241. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928) (holding that the
defendant’s conduct must be a breach of duty owed to the plaintiff).
242. See McNair, 818 S.E.2d at 861.
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policy considerations.243 Although the court’s duty determination was
erroneous,244 its analytical approach of distinguishing strict products liability
from negligence was correct: strict products liability and negligence are two
fundamentally distinct theories of liability that do not turn on either’s
viability.245 Thus, because the two theories run parallel to one another,
allowing one theory to proceed in lieu of the other does not produce an end
run effect.246
2. No Duty Findings Misconstrue Basic Tort Doctrine
The doctrinal considerations advanced by courts in finding no duty of care
also rest on shaky legs, starting with the contention that brand-name
manufacturers do not “intend to communicate” with generic users and thus
cannot be held to owe them a duty of care.247 This argument’s fatal flaw
flows from its unsubstantiated position that the brand-name manufacturer is
only in privity with its own consumers, and thus, its duty to warn tracks the
limits of contract.248 Indeed, this reasoning is flawed because it conflates the
very nature of obligations that arise under tort law with those that originate
in contract. Over a century ago, in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,249 thenJudge Benjamin Cardozo abolished privity as a limit on duty in tort law:
We have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb, when
the consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows out of contract and
nothing else. We have put the source of the obligation where it ought to
be. We have put its source in the law.250

Thus, those owed a duty of care by brand-name manufacturers are not limited
to persons with whom the manufacturers have contracted, but to whom tort
law says they owe such obligations to. While contract may, without doubt,
be one source of legal obligation, it does not subsume the duties imposed on
brand-name manufacturers by the institution that is tort law. Therefore,
privity as a basis for the intended-communication argument presents an
unworkable model.
Next, the doctrinal argument claiming that brand-name manufacturers
possess “no control” over generic drugs and that liability should therefore not
follow251 also falls short of establishing no duty. While it is true that brandname manufacturers do not retain control over the generic drug’s
manufacture or marketing, it is equally true that they do control the contents
243. See id. at 866.
244. See infra Part IV.B.
245. See McNair, 818 S.E.2d at 866.
246. See id.
247. See supra notes 195–98 and accompanying text.
248. See Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 727 F.3d 1273, 1285 (10th Cir. 2013); Mensing v. Wyeth,
Inc., 588 F.3d 603, 613 n.9 (8th Cir. 2009); Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165,
171 (4th Cir. 1994); Huck v. Wyeth, Inc., 850 N.W.2d 353, 371 (Iowa 2014); Stanley v.
Wyeth, Inc., 991 So. 2d 31, 34 (La. Ct. App. 2008).
249. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
250. Id. at 1053.
251. See supra notes 199–200 and accompanying text.
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of the generic drug’s warning label.252 This sort of control is relevant and
sufficient for duty to attach because generic plaintiffs do not claim negligent
manufacture253 as the basis for their cause of action but rather that the brandname defendant was careless in promulgating its warning label and that this
carelessness furnished a but-for cause of their injury. Because the claim
arises out of the brand-name manufacturer’s handling of its own warning
label and not the generic drug’s manufacture or marketing, liability does, in
fact, follow control.
Finally, the argument that injury to generic users is merely a foreseeable
outcome of federal law—not the brand-name manufacturer’s conduct254—is
of no moment. It is one thing to minimize the effect of foreseeability in the
duty analysis,255 but another to suggest that there are no foreseeable risks of
harm to generic users stemming from negligent labeling of brand-name
drugs. While the former is a defensible position, the latter is not.
As the case law indicates, federal law’s mandate that generic drugs have
the same warning labels as their brand-name counterparts supplies
foreseeability.256 This federal mandate makes it plainly foreseeable to the
brand-name manufacturer that deficiencies in its warning label “will be
perpetuated in the label for its generic bioequivalent.”257 Thus, while one
can certainly criticize such a federal regulatory regime as promoting unsound
public policy or engendering unfairness, one cannot credibly contend that
harm to generic users is unforeseeable.
B. The Case for Duty
This Note argues, in essence, that traditional tort doctrine and public policy
considerations can coalesce in finding a duty of care. Indeed, in reflecting
upon the history of the common law and the distinctive features of the brandname, generic-user relationship, courts can cobble together a compelling
doctrinal narrative for finding a duty of care. But in doing so, courts do not
work injustice to the other substantial consideration—public policy—that
underlies the duty inquiry. This much is true, for courts have the institutional
expertise—indeed, it’s perhaps their core competence—to craft negligence

252. See PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 613 (2011); see also 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(2)(A)(v) (2012).
253. If generic plaintiffs claimed negligent manufacture, not negligent failure to warn, then
the “no control” argument would indeed apply with full effect since the brand-name
manufacturer does not exercise any control over the generic drug’s physical production.
254. See supra notes 199–200 and accompanying text.
255. See Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 171 (4th Cir. 1994) (downplaying
the significance of foreseeability); see also supra notes 178–86 and accompanying text.
256. See, e.g., Garner v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 1:16-cv-01494-SLD-JEH, 2017 WL
6945335, at *7 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 6, 2017); Kellogg v. Wyeth, 762 F. Supp. 2d 694, 705 (D. Vt.
2010); Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, 159 So. 3d 649, 670 (Ala. 2014); T.H. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp.,
407 P.3d 18, 29–30 (Cal. 2017); Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 299, 311–12 (Ct. App.
2008); Rafferty v. Merck & Co., 92 N.E.3d 1205, 1214 (Mass. 2018).
257. See Novartis, 407 P.3d at 29.

2019]

THE DUTY OF STATE COURTS

2245

law in small-bore ways that allow for a duty of care while limiting liability.258
Furthermore, even if courts fail to rise to the occasion and the floodgates do,
in fact, burst from recognizing a duty of care, state legislatures and Congress
have shown the political will and aptitude to regulate the prescription drug
industry; thus, the political branches stand as a backstop to suspected judicial
shortcomings. Against this backdrop, this Note endeavors to convey a
fighting message to future courts deciding this difficult question: where tort
doctrine tells us there is a duty, yet public policy considerations stand in the
way, we must at least try to remain faithful to principle by giving effect to
that duty.
1. Back to the Basics: Cardozo’s MacPherson
History lends formidable support to finding a duty to warn between brandname manufacturers and generic users. In 1916, Judge Cardozo, in the
seminal tort case MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., confronted the daunting
question of whether an automobile manufacturer owed a duty of care to an
injured user of its vehicle with whom it lacked privity.259 In concluding that
a duty of care was owed, Judge Cardozo articulated several factors that lie at
the core of duty in negligence: whether the manufacturer knew “of a danger,
not merely possible, but probable” that would result from negligent conduct
and whether it was “reasonably certain” that the defendant’s negligent
conduct would put “life and limb in peril.”260 By examining such
considerations—awareness and probability of harm and the nature of the
injury—the MacPherson court grappled with the context in which the
litigants’ relationship arose to answer the duty question.261 Likewise, and
over a century later, MacPherson’s emphasis on context provides a powerful
justification for recognizing a duty of care between brand-name
manufacturers and generic users.
As applied here, the first batch of MacPherson considerations—awareness
and probability of harm262—cuts for duty in light of the prescription drug
industry’s distinctive federal regulatory scheme. Because federal law
obligates generic manufacturers to adopt the brand-name warning label,263
the brand-name manufacturer is aware that generic users will suffer harm
should the label fail to adequately warn of any adverse side effects.
Accordingly, it is awareness—not mere foreseeability264—that enhances the
case for duty because brand-name manufacturers know ex ante that
negligently crafting its own warning labels will inevitably cause physical

258. This is what the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court did in recalibrating the breach
element from negligence to recklessness. See Rafferty, 92 N.E.3d at 1219.
259. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1051 (N.Y. 1916).
260. Id. at 1053.
261. See id.
262. See id.
263. See PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 613 (2011).
264. See T.H. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 407 P.3d 18, 29–30 (Cal. 2017) (discussing
foreseeability of harm).
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harm to generic users.265 In addition, the probability of this harm is great266
because, under PLIVA, brand-name manufacturers are the only ones that can
unilaterally strengthen drug warning labels.267 Therefore, since the power to
draft a drug’s warnings label lies exclusively within the domain of the brandname manufacturer, the likelihood of harm to generic users is at its maximum
where the brand-name manufacturer declines to use reasonable care in
making this label.
From a more fundamental perspective, holding that there exists no duty of
care despite the brand’s awareness of impending harm to generic consumers
cannot be squared with the rest of our legal system, which places a premium
on knowledge—that is, the mens rea element in criminal law or intentional
torts like assault and battery. A colorable argument can even be made that
this premium on knowledge is a fortiori in tort law.268 Indeed, our legal
system operates this way because of the bedrock legal principle that
knowledge of harm generates a legal obligation to avoid causing that harm.
And history, as embodied in MacPherson, crystallizes this bedrock principle
by providing the key insight that brand-name manufacturers owe a duty of
care to generic users because of their awareness of potential harm and the
near certitude of injury that will befall generic users should manufacturers
fail to exercise due care.269
Continuing on, the second MacPherson consideration—the nature of the
injury270—also cuts overwhelmingly in favor of finding a duty of care.
Deficient prescription drug warning labels generate risks of injury that are of
a serious and permanent character. As evident from the California, Iowa,
Massachusetts, and West Virginia line of cases,271 defective warnings have
contributed to palpable harms such as gangrene, tardive dyskinesia,
respiratory disease, and, of course, death.272 Accordingly, in MacPherson’s
terms, inadequate brand-name warning labels cast the generic user’s “life and
limb in peril,” and, thus, this feature of the brand-name, generic-user
relationship obligates the brand-name manufacturer to use reasonable care
when crafting its warning label.
It is also crucial to note that in asking courts to recognize a duty of care,
the generic user does not seek relief for subservient discomforts under tort
law, such as emotional distress or economic loss.273 Instead, she seeks legal
recourse for lifelong harms that—in addition to causing profound physical
discomfort—can deprive her of her ability to live out her life with dignity.
On such injuries, our centuries-old common law has clearly spoken: tort law
does not turn a blind eye to such harms. Thus, the real, irreversible, and
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

See MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053.
See id.
See PLIVA, 564 U.S. at 614–15.
See supra Part III.A.1.
See MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053.
See id.
See supra Parts II.B–C.
See supra Parts II.B–C.
See supra Parts II.B–C.
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concrete injuries suffered by the generic user must be actionable under the
tort of negligence because it is precisely this category of harms that
MacPherson and enduring tort tradition say that tortfeasors have a duty to
prevent.274
The third and final insight that MacPherson provides is the fighting
message to courts to retain fidelity to doctrine when deciding whether a duty
of care exists. This Note concedes, frankly and sympathetically, that the duty
question in the brand-name, generic-user context is difficult and rife with
conflicting justifications that courts must grapple with. But in tackling these
issues, courts can take comfort in the fact that Judge Cardozo, too, grappled
with the same difficult questions over a century ago in MacPherson.275 As
two leading tort scholars remark:
From a modern perspective, the question [of whether a manufacturer owes
a duty of care to a product user not in privity] may seem too trivial to merit
asking, but in Cardozo’s day, it was not quite so easy. It is now part of our
ordinary social and moral understanding that businesses which
manufacture and market products to consumers have certain
responsibilities to those consumers, and that those consumers have certain
legitimate expectations of manufacturers. These sorts of expectations are
built by the law itself in some measure.276

Thus, MacPherson tells the tale that courts, in following where tort doctrine
leads them, can break from current social norms and understandings when
articulating new duties of care.277 At bottom, though recognizing a duty of
care between a manufacturer and the consumers of generic equivalents of its
products may very well seem novel and unintuitive under modern societal
norms, MacPherson’s core takeaway is that courts are not shackled by social
intuitions when crafting tort law.278 Indeed, just as MacPherson eradicated
privity as the defining flavor of negligence law over a century ago,279 so too
can modern courts shape new understandings and expectations of the
prescription drug industry by recognizing a duty of care.
2. The “Integration” Principle
In addition to history, the intimate nature of the brand-name, generic-user
relationship, as furnished by federal law, provides further support for the
position that a duty of care flows from the former to the latter. To start off,
duty opponents are correct in contending that there is no formal relationship
between brand-name manufacturers and generic users; after all, generic users
are neither the immediate buyers nor the direct users of the brand-name

274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

See MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053.
See id.
See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 204, at 1816.
See MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053; Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 204, at 1816.
See MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053; Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 204, at 1816.
See MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053.
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product.280 Nonetheless, despite the lack of formal privity, a duty of care
endures because of the close association the brand name and generic user find
themselves in by virtue of federal law.
Under the federal regulatory scheme, the brand name’s innovation supplies
the foundation for producing its generic-drug counterparts: the generic
manufacturer is obligated to ensure that its drug has the same physical
composition and warning label as that of the brand name.281 Consequently,
this sui generis framework for the prescription drug industry turns the brandname manufacturer into a component manufacturer of the generic drug by
making it the de facto supplier of a constituent part—the intellectual
property—that is integrated into the final generic product.282 Among other
things, “intellectual property” here encompasses the brand name’s research
and development, representations of pharmaceutical safety to the FDA and
the public at large, and, most importantly, the biochemical composition of
the generic drug. The integration of this intellectual property into the generic
product thus establishes a tight nexus between brand-name manufacturers
and generic users that is exceeded only by the buyer-seller relationship shared
by the brand-name manufacturer and its direct consumer.
To reiterate then, the integration argument states that the closely intimate
relationship between brand-name manufacturers and generic users is a
creature of federal law that provides the requisite foundation for finding duty
by turning the brand name into a component manufacturer of the generic
drug. Viewed from this vantage point, a duty of care undoubtedly exists
because the brand name’s original intellectual property and representations
of pharmaceutical safety—as integrated into the generic drug—lie at the crux
of generic users’ failure-to-warn claims.283 Indeed, it is the brand name’s
pharmaceutical recipe that the generic user comes into contact with and the
lack of adequate warning accompanying this intellectual property causes
injury from such contact. To the contrary, the argument that no duty of care
is owed because generic users ingest the generic drug, not the brand-name
drug,284 is unavailing because it focuses on trivial features—the plastic
exterior enveloping the substance and the commercial identity of the
manufacturer—that are of no consequence to generic users’ claims. Their
280. See, e.g., Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 171 (4th Cir. 1994)
(discussing the lack of privity).
281. See Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2471 (2013) (stating that federal law
requires a generic drug to be chemically and biologically equivalent to its “brand-name
counterpart”).
282. This Note does not go as far as saying that the brand-name manufacturer is strictly
liable to generic users. Although the manufacturer supplies the intellectual property for the
generic drug, it does not partake in the selling of the generic product, thus precluding the
application of strict products liability.
283. One might also add that the integration argument hits back at the core of the duty
opponents’ end run argument because, in viewing the intellectual property as a component
part of the generic drug, the brand-name manufacturer has directly caused the generic user’s
injury with its product, the intellectual property. See supra notes 156–75 and accompanying
text.
284. See supra notes 156–75 and accompanying text.
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legal claim is, at its core, not about the generic pill’s physical casing or the
drug’s commercial name—which are indeed discrepant between brand-name
and generic drugs—but about the drug’s intellectual property and its lack of
accompanying warning, both of which are exclusively supplied and
controlled by the brand-name manufacturer.285 In light of this inextricable
link, brand-name manufacturers do owe generic users a duty of care.
Before turning to the public policy discussion, it is worth addressing the
inherent fairness—or alleged lack thereof—of imposing a duty of care on the
makers of brand-name drugs. Opponents can certainly attack this Note’s
integration argument by contending that federal law’s esoteric framework for
the prescription drug industry is beyond the brand-name manufacturer’s
control,286 and thus, it is unfair to impose a duty of care based on this
rationale. However, there are two succinct responses that turn this argument
on its head. First, duty in negligence law does not turn on fairness but on
doctrinal considerations as applied to a particular plaintiff-defendant
relationship.287 And in fact, many duties of care that tort law recognizes or
rejects can be characterized, to some degree, as inherently unfair: the duty
of care owed to trespassers on one’s property,288 the duty of care a Good
Samaritan assumes upon initiating a benevolent rescue,289 and, conversely,
no duty on local police to save members of the public.290 Thus, tort doctrine,
not fairness, draws the contours of duty.
Second, even if one were to concede that fairness is relevant to duty,
fairness is inherently unreliable and subject to variation based on which lens
one uses to view a set of facts. A brand-name manufacturer faced with a duty
of care to generic users may very well argue that it is unfair to expose it to
liability for another competitor’s product.291 At the same time, for the injured
generic user who has just had her arm amputated because of gangrene caused
by a generic drug,292 no duty is just as, if not more, unfair because it shuts
her out from legal recourse.293 Thus, these contradictory views beg the fatal
question: Even if fairness enters the duty calculus, what exactly is fairness
and how do we go about consistently construing it under the duty question?

285. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2471 (observing that federal law requires generic drugs to
be chemically and biologically equivalent to the brand-name drugs); PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing,
564 U.S. 604, 613 (2011) (holding that generic manufacturers must replicate the brand-name
drug’s warning label).
286. See supra notes 195–200 and accompanying text.
287. See supra Part IV.B.
288. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968) (holding that “a man’s
life or limb does not become less worthy” because he is a trespasser).
289. See, e.g., Swicegood v. PLIVA, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1356 (N.D. Ga. 2008).
290. See, e.g., Riss v. City of New York, 240 N.E.2d 860, 861 (N.Y. 1968).
291. See Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 169–70 (4th Cir. 1994).
292. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 558 (2009).
293. See Franzman v. Wyeth, Inc., 451 S.W.3d 676, 691 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014) (stating that
generic users are “cut adrift in a sea of hopelessness” because they are shut out from relief).
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3. A Fighting Message to Courts
As noted above, this Note does not wish to engage in the substantive public
policy debate coloring the duty question.294 Instead, this Note contends that,
notwithstanding the veracity of the policy concerns undergirding the no duty
position,295 courts are institutionally equipped to address these concerns
because of their core competence in crafting tort law. Furthermore, this Note
contends that even if courts do fall short and fallout ensues from their
recognition of a duty of care, state legislatures and Congress have shown the
political will and wherewithal to regulate the prescription drug industry.
Thus, this two-tiered system of defense against the public policy
considerations at stake provides a safe harbor for courts to experiment with
and find a duty of care.
a. Core Judicial Competence in Crafting Tort Law
to Prevent Public Policy Concerns
Courts have the institutional capacity to meet the public policy challenges
associated with recognizing a duty of care because of their core competence
in crafting tort law.296 As noted above, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court’s decision in Rafferty is a prime example of such core competence.297
As discussed in Part II, the Rafferty court came upon a fork in the road
when it found principle to cut for duty and policy to cut against it.298 But
instead of treating duty as a zero-sum issue, the court split the baby and found
duty by applying its core competence in tort law and recalibrating the breach
element from negligence to recklessness.299 The court’s tweaking of the
breach element thus kept the policy concerns at bay while providing injured
generic users an avenue of legal recourse against the more flagrant behavior
of brand-name manufacturers.300 And in making this judicial adjustment, the
court was able to remain faithful to tort doctrine while alleviating its pressing
public policy concerns.301
Likewise, future courts in deciding this question can follow
Massachusetts’s remedial approach because all courts share the same core
judicial competence in crafting tort law. Furthermore, courts have a wealth
of options to address public policy issues via negligence claims given

294. For a discussion of the public policy considerations embedded in the duty analysis,
see supra Parts III.B–C.
295. But see GARBER, supra note 220, at 62 (disagreeing with these policy concerns).
296. See, e.g., Rafferty v. Merck & Co., 92 N.E.3d 1205, 1222 (Mass. 2018) (“[W]e do not
believe that by recognizing liability for recklessness we overstep our bounds and intrude into
matters for which ‘courts are not institutionally qualified.’” (quoting Huck v. Wyeth, Inc., 850
N.W.2d 353, 377 (Iowa 2014))). But see Huck v. Wyeth, Inc., 850 N.W.2d 353, 377 (Iowa
2014); McNair v. Johnson & Johnson, 818 S.E.2d 852, 866 (W. Va. 2018).
297. Rafferty, 92 N.E.3d at 1222.
298. Id. at 1215–22.
299. Id. at 1219–20.
300. Id.
301. Id.
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negligence’s four-element structure of duty, breach, causation, and injury.302
Thus, in addition to tinkering with breach, as Massachusetts did, courts can
recognize a duty of care and address public policy concerns by finessing a
variety of elements under the tort of negligence.
For example, courts may limit liability through proximate causation,
especially if the sequence by which the generic user’s injuries transpire is
unforeseeable or too attenuated from the brand-name manufacturer’s
negligent conduct.303 Courts could also finesse the injury element by
capping the damages ultimately afforded to generic plaintiffs or by making
actionable only a certain class of injuries. Finally, courts could ratchet up
the evidentiary standard from preponderance of the evidence to clear and
convincing, which would enhance protection for brand-name defendants
against meritless claims. Accordingly, these examples make clear that courts
could retain fidelity to doctrine and recognize duty while simultaneously
stifling the outbreak of ominous policy consequences.304
Of course, duty opponents may question what good recognizing duty even
does if courts can employ alternative ways to limit generic plaintiffs’ ultimate
recovery. This argument, however, fails because it misconceives duty and,
more broadly, tort law, as solely a vehicle for compensation.305 While
compensation is undoubtedly an important feature of negligence law, it is
emphatically not its defining characteristic; there is intrinsic value to
recognizing a duty of care that exists independent of compensating private
parties.306 For this intrinsic value flows from the empowerment conferred
upon the injured generic user against her tortfeasor, and the humanistic
gesture of the legal system in telling the generic user, “I understand and
recognize the wrong that has been afflicted upon you.” Duty in negligence,
thus, is not a means to an end but an end in and of itself, and, accordingly, to
conceive of duty as merely a question of liability discounts the considerable
deontic value inherent in it.
b. The Political Branches Provide a Safe Harbor
Courts can also rest assured when finding a duty of care because, should
palpable policy harms ensue, state legislatures and Congress will step in to
address those concerns. Evidence of the political branches’ will and ability
302. Indeed, this wealth of options idea extends to courts viewing tort law primarily
through a law and economics lens. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, Civil Recourse Theory’s
Reductionism, 88 IND. L.J. 449, 452 (2013) (“I am traditional enough to begin with the four
classic elements and what they mean: duty, breach, causation, and damages.”).
303. See In re Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 726 (2d Cir. 1964) (limiting liability to
where there exists proximate cause).
304. There is an inherent argument to be made as well. If a second-year law student—like
this Note’s author—can think of such judicial adjustments, there is no reason to believe courts
cannot also do so with greater creativity and proficiency.
305. See generally Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO.
L.J. 695 (2003) (arguing that tort law is about providing recourse, not merely monetary
compensation).
306. See generally id.
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to intervene is perhaps most clear from the complex federal regulatory
scheme,307 supplemented by state regulations,308 that currently governs the
prescription drug industry. The complex and comprehensive nature of these
regulations suggest that the political branches take a keen interest in the
prescription drug industry and, further, that they do not perceive the common
law to be the sole arbiter of the industry’s warning-label obligations.
Successful past tort reform movements also reinforce the notion that state
legislatures can help out if public policy fallouts result.309 In sum, then, the
political branches operate effectively as a second line of defense. Courts
should therefore take stock of the safe harbor that this provides and recognize
a duty of care according to the compelling doctrinal justifications presented
by the brand-name, generic-user context.310
CONCLUSION
The duty question embedded in the brand-name, generic-user context is
one that raises serious concerns and has uncomfortable real-world effects.
But despite this, courts should not shy away from the task of faithfully
applying tort doctrine as embodied in history and precedent. As Justice Felix
Frankfurter once argued, “the judiciary is jeopardized when courts become
embroiled in the passions of the day and assume primary responsibility in
choosing between competing political, economic and social pressures.”311
No doubt, while endorsing duty requires an abundance of courage in the face
of colossal socioeconomic pressures, courts should nevertheless do so
because the doctrine demands that a duty of care be recognized.312 As history
demonstrates, some of the greatest snippets of tort law—Cardozo’s
abolishment of privity over a century ago313 and Justice Roger Traynor’s
introduction of strict products liability314—also required judicial courage at
their inception. These instances, in closing, thus reaffirm and underscore the
core message of this Note: where tort law says there is a duty of care, courts
should endeavor to effectuate that duty.

307. See generally Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013) (discussing the
complex federal regulatory scheme for the prescription drug industry); PLIVA, Inc. v.
Mensing, 564 U.S. 604 (2011) (discussing the modern federal regulatory framework for the
prescription drug industry).
308. See PLIVA, 564 U.S. at 628 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (discussing how every state
has enacted some form of prescription substitution laws); Schwartz et al., supra note 48, at
1861 (finding that many states have enacted products liability statutes).
309. See generally F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the “Tort Reform”
Movement, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 437 (2006) (surveying recent tort reform).
310. See supra Part IV.B.
311. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
312. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
313. See generally MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
314. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 461–62 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring).
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ADDENDUM
As this Note was going to press, a 6-3 majority of the U.S. Supreme Court
handed down a decision on a federal maritime tort claim that was strikingly
analogous to the generic users’ claims against brand-name pharmaceutical
manufacturers analyzed above. Air & Liquid Systems Corp. v. DeVries315 is
a self-described federal common law decision that focuses on the duty issue
in a negligence claim against a product manufacturer. As described briefly
below, Justice Kavanaugh’s decision for six members of the Court provides
strong—albeit indirect—support for the recognition of a duty of care between
brand-name manufacturers and generic users.
In DeVries, the defendants had manufactured ship equipment for the U.S.
Navy, which the Navy later integrated with asbestos products made by third
parties.316 Many years later, plaintiffs—Navy veterans who had been
exposed to this integrated asbestos—brought negligence claims against the
equipment manufacturer, alleging that the manufacturer owed them a duty to
warn of asbestos’s harmful effects because of the noxious material’s
foreseeable incorporation into the defendants’ ship equipment.317 In
response, the defendants argued that they had not manufactured the asbestos
and, accordingly, could not be held liable for harms flowing from another
manufacturer’s product.318
The Court ruled for the injured plaintiffs and held that, in the maritime
context, a “manufacturer does have a duty to warn [users of the final
integrated product] when its product requires incorporation of a part and the
manufacturer knows or has reason to know that the integrated product is
likely to be dangerous for its intended uses.”319 In so reasoning, the Court
rejected the defendants’ argument that, because they had not manufactured
the asbestos itself, the plaintiff must fail on the duty element.320 Moreover,
the Court rejected the defendants’ public policy arguments against such
liability.321 In lieu of such considerations, the Court rested its rationale for
the recognition of a duty on: (1) the combination of the foreseeability of the
integrated product and the knowledge that future uses of its product would
require the inclusion of the asbestos, and (2) economic efficiency, which the
Court concluded supported duty because of the defendants’ superior position
to warn of asbestos harms.322
DeVries strongly supports the proposal defended in the body of this Note:
clear doctrinal and policy analysis yields a duty of care from brand-name
manufacturers to generic users in the prescription drug context. Here, as in
315. No. 17-1104 (U.S. Mar. 19, 2019).
316. Id. at 1.
317. Id. at 1–2.
318. Id. at 2.
319. Id. at 6.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 8–9.
322. Id. at 8–10. It is important to note, however, that the Court did not hold foreseeability
to be sufficient alone in justifying a duty of care. Id. at 7 (“To begin, we agree with the
manufacturers that a rule of mere foreseeability would sweep too broadly.”).
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the maritime context of DeVries, the brand name “knows or has reason to
know” that its product—the prescription warning label—will be integrated
into the generic drug due to the FDA’s mandate requiring integration;323
furthermore, this integration of the brand name’s warning label and the
generic drug is required under federal law,324 just as the integration of
asbestos and the DeVries defendants’ equipment was required for its
intended use by the Navy.325 Accordingly, the integration rationale
undergirding the Court’s duty conclusion in DeVries likewise triggers a duty
of care between brand-name manufacturers and generic users. Finally, the
DeVries Court’s economic efficiency justification326—which asks the
question of who is in the best position to warn—also supports the recognition
of a brand-name manufacturer duty to generic users: not only is the brand
name in the best position to warn of harmful side effects, but it is also the
only actor in a position to warn given PLIVA’s requirement of warning-label
sameness.327
To be sure, the Supreme Court notes that “[m]aritime law has always
recognized a ‘special solicitude for the welfare’ of those who undertake to
‘venture upon hazardous and unpredictable sea voyages,’” and the subject of
this Note is state products liability law, not federal maritime law.328
Nonetheless, if there were ever an element of state common law designed to
be solicitous of plaintiffs, it is that involving persons injured by consumer
products. As this Note’s introduction aptly observed, the emergence of strict
products liability in the common law serves as a telltale sign of tort law’s
solicitude for injured product consumers. Consequently, it is this Note’s
view that the Court’s theoretical framework underpinning duty in DeVries
may carry over and, indeed, furnish a duty of care in the brand-name
manufacturer, generic-user relationship.

323. See generally PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604 (2011) (outlining the federal
regulatory framework governing the prescription drug industry).
324. Id. at 613 (observing that federal law requires generic drugs to integrate the warning
labels of their brand-name counterparts).
325. Id.
326. DeVries, No. 17-1104, slip op. at 8 (“Importantly, the product manufacturer will often
be in a better position than the parts manufacturer to warn of the danger from the integrated
product.”).
327. PLIVA, 564 U.S. at 613.
328. DeVries, No. 17-1104, slip op. at 9 (quoting Am. Exp. Lines, Inc. v. Alvez, 446 U.S.
274, 285 (1980) (plurality opinion)).

